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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of CASTOR (Cathode/Anode Satellite Thruster for Orbital Repositioning) satellite 
is to demonstrate in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) a nanosatellite that uses a Divergent Cusped Field 
Thruster (DCFT) to perform orbital maneuvers representative of an orbital transfer vehicle. 
Powered by semi-deployable solar arrays generating 165W of power, CASTOR will achieve 
nearly 1 krn/s of velocity increment over one year. As a technology demonstration mission, 
success of CASTOR in LEO will pave the way for a low cost, high delta-V orbital transfer 
capability for small military and civilian payloads in support of Air Force and NASA missions. 
The educational objective is to engage graduate and undergraduate students in critical roles in the 
design, development, test, carrier integration and on-orbit operations of CASTOR as a 
supplement to their curricular activities. This program is laying the foundation for a long-term 
satellite construction program at MIT. The satellite is being designed as a part of AFRL's 
University Nanosatellite Program, which provides the funding and a framework in which student 
satellite teams compete for a launch to orbit. To this end, the satellite must fit within an 
envelope of 50cmx50cmx60cm, have a mass of less than 50kg, and meet stringent structural and 
other requirements. In this framework, the CASTOR team successfully completed PDR in 
August 2009 and CDR in April 2010 and will compete at FCR (Flight Competition Review) in 
January 2011. The complexity of the project requires implementation of many systems 
engineering techniques which allow for development of CASTOR from conception through FCR 
and encompass the full design, fabrication, and testing process. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
MIT's Cathode/Anode Satellite Thruster for Orbital Repositioning (CASTOR) is an orbital 
maneuver and transfer bus with the technical objective of achieving one kilometer per second of 
delta-V over a one year mission in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). This is accomplished using a novel 
electric propulsion system described below. As a technology demonstration mission, the success 
of CASTOR in LEO will pave the way for a modular bus design, which would provide small 
payloads with a low cost, high delta-V orbital transfer capability in support of the NASA ESMD 
exploration and technology development missions. CASTOR will serve as a technology 
demonstration of this concept and of the DCFT (Diverging Cusped-Field Thruster) under 
AFRL's University Nanosatellite Program. 
1.1 UNP/CAPSTONE CLASS 
The UNP is a program jointly sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory's Space Vehicles 
Directorate (AFRLIRV), the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) to educate and train the future 
workforce through a national student satellite design and fabrication competition. This program 
is held biannually, currently undergoing its sixth iteration. A major focus area of UNP is 
developing student's communication abilities of technical topics. Each student's communications 
abilities are challenged before beginning the program, as entry into this program requires a 
detailed proposal about the student's design, motivation, and reason for participation which 
follows the UNP guidelines. MIT undergraduate capstone students, under the guidance of Space 
Systems Laboratory (SSL) faculty and graduate students, successfully gained its first entry into 
this program in the winter of 2009. 
After being accepted, the team must begin iterating through design ideas. It is critical that the 
design and rational behind it are thoroughly documented as members are in flux and one cannot 
guarantee that the entire team will be able to remain with the design from conception to [mal 
product delivery (a 2 year period). Furthermore, this documentation is used on future satellite 
designs to ensure that mistakes are not repeated, granting the MIT Satellite Team continuity. 
Good documentation of the design goes beyond aiding the team, and is used as one of the 
primary methods of comparing competing university's designs and ensuring that predefined 
limitations are taken into consideration. Thus UNP ensures that students are not simply good at 
communicating ideas to others but also at processing others communications to them. 
UNP grants students the opportunity to refine their communication abilities during a series of 
documentation submittals and design presentations. Each university undergoes five major design 
reviews: system concept review, preliminary design review, critical design review, proto-
qualification review, and flight competition review. During these reviews, the team's 
documentation of the design (including design documentation, risk matrix, safety procedures, 
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and requests for waivers), presentation about the design, and actual design itself are the primary 
aspects used to differentiate competing universities. Both the documentation and presentations 
are judged by a panel of experts. These experts provide feedback on the documentation and 
presentation to ensure that students develop their communications abilities. Thus the best design 
is not the guaranteed winner; the team that best communicates having a good design will win. 
1.2 MISSION OBJECTIVE 
The mission of CASTOR is to validate the performance and application of Diverging Cusped 
Field Thruster (DCFT) technology. This will be achieved by taking on-orbit state data to 
compare the degradation experienced by the DCFT to that of similar technologies. Mission 
objectives are: 
• Minimum Success: Demonstrate that the DCFT will operate on-orbit 
o Objective: Operate the DCFT on orbit for 1500 hours, which is comparable to 
similar technologies 
• Minimum Success: Use the DCFT to provide a measurable change in velocity 
o Objective: Measure the on-orbit performance, efficiency, and degradation of the 
DCFT during orbital maneuvers 
The success criteria of these mission objectives are: 
• DCFT Operation 
o Capture images of the DCFT as it thrusts. If the images show the plume is red, 
then the engine is not just venting Xenon 
o Show that the DCFT can transition from a standby heating mode to a full power 
operational mode 
• DCFT Characterization 
o Measure a noticeable change in velocity to show performance 
o Measure the velocity over equal increments to determine if the degradation of the 
DCFT effects the performance of the vehicle 
o Compare input power of the engine to the output thrust to show the efficiency of 
the engine 
o Capture images of the plume, showing the change in flame color, which dictates 
the degradation of the DCFT 
1.3 ESMD RELEVANCE 
The availability of a low-cost Orbital Transfer Vehicle that can reach the Moon, Lagrange 
Points, and beyond will enhance NASA's capabilities for low-cost space exploration and 
scientific discovery. CASTOR serves as a key technology demonstration of this OTV capability 
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in its demonstration of almost 1 km/s of delta-V in its one-year mission, a high delta-V for a 
satellite its size. This provides the following capabilities for NASA ESMD: 
• A low-cost OTV with 2.0 km/sec of delta-V, or an upgraded CASTOR vehicle, would be 
able to depart GEO or GTO to carry small scientific payloads to lunar orbit (or impact) in 
support of lunar science. This would augment NASA's program to return to the Moon 
with a low-cost robotic exploration capability. Furthermore, it could provide a Scout-
class lunar mission capability financially accessible to universities. 
• Such an OTV could also depart GTO or GEO to travel to Lagrange Points where 
numerous astrophysical missions are envisioned to operate. One such mission is Stellar 
Imager (S1), a synthetic imaging mission that uses ultra-violet optics on multiple small, 
65 kg spacecraft to image exo-solar stellar disks. The process of synthetic imaging 
requires that these individual spacecraft be frequently maneuvered to different relative 
locations to fill the Fourier coverage of the image being synthesized. A derivative of the 
CASTOR design could fulfill the needs of this mission. Other possible roles at ESL2 
include inspection, repair, replenishment, and orbital maintenance of unstable Halo orbits 
of other astrophysical facilities . 
• Autonomous rendezvous, close-proximity operations and capture/docking are essential 
enablers for telescope servicing, robotic assembly, inspection, and sample capture (Mars 
and Lunar Sample Return). These are enabled by efficient propulsion systems. 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF SUBSYSTEMS 
The current architecture of each sub-team is as follows: 
• Structures: Four trusses mount around the propellant tank using three tank clamps. 
The ESPA (EELV Secondary Payload Adapter) ring mount attaches to the bottom of 
the trusses; two of the solar array panels are body-mounted directly to the trusses, and 
the other two solar panels mount to opposing trusses with a hinge. The solar arrays 
deploy using linear actuators that release pins in the panels. The structural 
configuration is shown in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1: STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION 
• Thermal: The satellite is designed to sustain passive thermal control. Some 
components require surface treatments of Z93 in order to maintain operational 
temperatures. Temperature sensors will also be used to track the thermal state of the 
satellite to allow for active thermal control by increasing or decreasing power to 
certain units in response to unexpected temperatures. 
• Operations: The HETE ground station at Cayenne will be used. Pre-launch and 
launch operations are compiled in the Concept of Operations Document (ConOps). 
The on-orbit operations will be performed as follows: detumble, solar panel 
deployment, commissioning, system verification (standard orbit operations), 
decommissioning, and finally end of life via an uncontrolled re-entry. Orbital 
maneuvers will be performed in LEO to demonstrate high delta-v capability via 
orbital altitude changes. 
• ADCS: Attitude determination will be performed with 4 Sinclair sun sensors, 2 PNI 
Corporation 3-axis magnetometers, and a 3-axis gyro. Attitude control will be 
performed with 3 reaction wheel assemblies in each orthogonal thrust axis and 3 
torque coils in each orthogonal axis. GPS navigation will be used for GNC using a 
space-rated SSTL GPS receiver. Furthermore, a NORAD TLE is provided for free on 
a daily basis for a cross check. Furthermore, a magnet will be placed opposite the 
engine to cancel the engine dipole. 
• Avionics: The backbone of the avionics subsystem is 3 Microchip dsPIC33F 16-bit 
microcontrollers and a FLASH memory device. This is accompanied by all sensors 
and actuators while running FreeRTOS. 
• Communications: Two Microhard S-band modems will support two patch antennas 
to provide 115 Kbps data rate capability. 
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• Propulsion: A modified Hall thruster built in-house will operate in either high power 
mode, providing about 4 mN of thrust, or in off mode, in which the cathode will 
remain heated. The propulsion system will also consist of the tank and various 
plumbing components. The thruster will be mounted on the opposite end from the 
ESP A ring mount. Plumbing will be provided largely by a NASA-provided flow 
controller called the Xenon Feed System. 
• Power: Donated solar cells with an area of 1.1 m2 will provide a maximum of 160 W 
to the Maximum Peak Power Tracker, which will provide power to the various 
components as needed and to Nickel-Cadmium batteries for storage during eclipse. 
Furthermore, the custom Power Processing Unit (PPU) and Power Distribution Unit 
(PDU) will provide power to propulsion and all other systems, respectively. The solar 
panel con1iguration is shown in Figure 1. 
• Science and Payload: A camera pointed at the thruster plume will monitor the plume 
in order to measure engine health and thus efficiency throughout the mission. 
1.5 DELIVERABLES 
The CASTOR program has a series of deliverables, from hardware to documentation. 
By the end of the nanosatellite design and proto flight build phase, the program will have 
constructed a protoflight (protoqualification) nanosatellite and have participated in PDR, CDR, 
and PQR. Proto flight implies that the Flight Competition nanosatellite deliverable is a flight unit 
with full hardware traceability (vs. a non-flight Engineering Design Unit, or EDU). Specifically, 
this requires: 
• Proto flight Unit Nanosatellite: Experiment and support systems, including power to 
operate systems 
• Mechanical and electrical interfaces with the Lightband, on the nanosatellite side of the 
interface 
• Safety featureslinhibits for nanosatellite-related hazards 
• Ground handling and maintenance provisions for nanosats (mechanical and electrical) 
• Ground support equipment and related procedures 
• Operations (Ground, On-orbit) 
A series of documents is used to represent the current state of the satellite and serves as the 
documentation that is necessary to present at reviews and to potential customers. Furthermore, it 
provides an incremental status of the design at different levels of maturity. 
In order to maintain the documentation, it is necessary to implement a system of configuration 
control. Furthermore, this must be implemented in such a way that does not impose an excessive 
amount of documentation on the members of the CASTOR team. In general, configuration 
control systems require exorbitant amounts of paperwork to operate, so it is desired to find the 
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bare mmlmum of paperwork that is necessary to implement configuration control. This 
implementation is two-fold: (1) by placing incremental documentation that represents the state of 
the system at key points in the design process under the team' s fileshare and (2) by maintaining a 
system of Engineering Change Orders. 
TABLE 1: DOCUMENTATION SUMMARY 
Docu ment/Model Development Execution Status 
Phases Phases 
Requirements Verification Matrix A-B A-D 85% 
(RVM) 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) A B-E 80% 
Program Schedule A-C A-E 90% 
Budgets (MEL, Data, Power, A-C B-D 85% 
Communications) 
CONOPS A-C D-E 90% 
Risk Mitigation and Safety A-C D-E 50% 
Integrated Systems Model A-E D-E 90% 
Interface Control Documents B-C C-E 85% 
CAD Models B-C C-E 90% 
Systems Diagram B-D C-E 25% 
Electrical Schematic Diagrams B-D D-E 25% 
Manufacturing and Integration B-D D-E 70% 
Plan 
Testing Plans and Reports B-D D-E 75% 
Design Document B-D B-E 95% 
On-Orbit Handbook D-E E 10% 
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The first column represents the document that is being referenced. The second represents the 
phases in which the document is created and the third likewise represents the phases in which 
that document is executed and/or referenced. The final column represents the approximate status 
of completion of the document for the CASTOR program. The phases are defined according to 
the standard NASA system maturation process as shown below: 
• Phase A: Concept Development (completed with a System Requirements Review) 
• Phase B: Preliminary Design (completed with a Preliminary Design Review) 
• Phase C: Complete Design (completed with a Critical Design Review) 
• Phase D: Build and Test (completed with a Flight Readiness Review) 
• Phase E: Launch and Operations (Completed with end-of-mission) 
1.6 OUTLINE 
The remainder of this paper will: 
1. Describe the system engineering process used in designing and testing CASTOR 
2. How critical technologies are incorporated into the design 
3. How the systems of the satellite are integrated together 
4. How the satellite is fabricated and tested 
Other tools that are used in order to best design the satellite. 
2 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
2.1 CASTOR MILESTONES & RESOURCES 
Throughout the CASTOR program there are multiple significant milestones which the systems 
team needs to prepare the entire team for. The following milestones give a sense of the type of 
work focused on during each phase of development as well as a general time reference for the 
CASTOR program. 
Program Milestones 
SCR - Systems Concept Review (March 2009 via Telecon) 
• Focuses on challenging basic requirements and design concepts to determine if the 
satellite 's mission is feasible. 
SRR - Systems Requirement Review (April 2009 via Telecon) 
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• Reviews the underlying system requirements which will be driving all the major design 
decisions for the satellite. 
• Makes sure that these top-level requirements will lead to the right design. 
PDR - Preliminary Design Review (August 2009, Logan, UT) 
• First thorough scrubbing of the design by UNP and NASA down to every subsystem 
level. 
• Based on recommendations from UNP and NASA, significant design changes were made 
after PDR. 
CDR - Critical Design Review (April 2010, MIT) 
• CDR was the major milestone this semester. 
• UNP review of a mature satellite design. CDR was more focused on assessing UNP 
confidence in our design as well as program management procedures. 
• PQR - Proto-Qualification Review (August 2010, Logan, UT) 
• Focus is to display operable hardware to strengthen confidence in satellite design and 
program management 
FCR - Flight Competition Review (January 2011, Albuquerque, NM) 
• At FCR, each university will have a 15 minute presentation and then a hardware station 
afterwards and groups of judges will evaluate the final design and choose the winner. 
CASTOR Satellite 
Battery Box 
Patch Antenna 
ESPA Mount 
FIGURE 2: CASTOR SATELLITE 
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Significant design changes were made from PDR to CDR such as the deployable solar panels as 
well as the light band interface. This can be seen through the differences in this PDR layout vs. 
the CDR layout. 
FIGURE 3: PAST DESIGN ITERATIONS 
._-----------------_._-_._----_._---------------------._------ ._--------
2.1.1 INPUTS & OUTPUTS 
------_._------------_._--------------------------_._-------------
Identification of goals, in terms of inputs and outputs gives direction to the CASTOR project and 
helps to define the boundaries for achieving objectives. Primary inputs and outputs are outlined 
below: 
Inputs: 
• Personnel (undergraduate students, graduates, faculty mentors, and undergraduate 
researchers) 
• Facilities 
• Donors & Partners 
Outputs: 
• Proto-flight satellite (with supporting documentation and ground support) by January 
2011 for Flight Competition Review 
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2 2 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS/VALIDATION 
CASTOR's reqUIrements stem from a couple of dIfferent sources such as flowdown, mterfacmg, 
and UNP gUIdehnes Flowdown reqUIrements come from the mISSIOn and system reqUIrements 
meanmg that these are needed m order to meet the mISSIOn statement Another source for 
reqUIrements IS mterfacmg, whIch IS needed to ensure that everythmg mterfaces correctly The 
CASTOR team also needs to make sure that they comply wIth the UNP gUIdelmes 
The mISSIOn reqUIrements are stated as follows 
• Measure the on-orbIt performance, efficIency, and degradatIOn of the DCFT dunng 
orbItal maneuvers 
• Operate the DCFT on orbIt for 1500 hours 
The system reqUIrements are flowdown reqUIrements from these and are stated as follows 
• CASTOR shall have a DCFT as the pnmary propulsIOn system, WhICh shall operate 
throughout the mISSIOn hfetIme 
• The CASTOR bus must be able to support on-orbIt mISSIOn operatIOns for the mISSIOn 
hfetIme of at least 6 months 
• CASTOR shall provIde sufficIent state data to measure the change of performance, 
efficIency, and degradatIOn over the DCFT's operatIOnal hfetIme 
Each subsystem has reqUIrements that flowdown from these system reqUIrements 
In addItion to statmg each of the reqUIrements, the spreadsheet hsts the document that shows 
how that reqUIrement was met and the test that venfied It was met For mstance, the 
reqUIrement "EPS must be able to generate 113 7W m a fully operatIOnal state" IS met m the 
DeSIgn DocumentatIOn and tested m the solar panel test 
The RVM has all of the reqUIrements hsted and each of these reqUIrements IS met through the 
deSIgn All of the reqUIrements have a venficatIOn document hsted, and If apphcable the 
appropnate test IS hsted (AppendIx 9 1) 
22 1 RELIABILITY, SURVIVABILITY AND PRODUCTION 
- -
An overarchmg objective of the CASTOR program IS to produce a rehable satellIte that can 
survIve launch and operate III orbIt To thIS end, reqUIrements flow down to the vanous 
subsystems to meet these mISSIOn objectives SurvIval goals generally correlate WIth UNP 
reqUIrements whIch stem from well-margmed launch reqUIrements For comphance WIth these 
reqUIrements, CASTOR must survIVe 20 G forces m all dIrectIOns, and have a lowest natural 
frequency above 100Hz Ensunng that the CASTOR structure can meet these restnctIons, and 
do so rehably, reqUIres careful deSIgn and plannmg 
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Often the best way to see If a desIgn works IS to buIld It The structure alone has undergone at 
least some redesIgn after each tIme It was bUIlt Learnmg how to desIgn parts that are easy to 
assemble and manufacture IS key to creatmg a sImple desIgn By havmg students bUIld what 
they desIgn, students can IdentIfy what aspects need Improvement For mstance, usmg a 
standard set of screw SIzes IS Important so as to reduce lead tIme on orderIng parts and tools It 
also allows for mterchangeabIlIty of wrenches and such whIch makes facIlItates bUIldmg 
-
222 SAFETY 
From a human factors and safety standpomt, the safety of personnel mvolved m all stages of 
desIgn through operatIOns IS of paramount Importance WIth safety m mmd, conservatIve 
chOIces are made throughout the desIgn process to lead to the generatIOn of a product that IS safe 
to operate DesIgns are reqUIred to meet certam safety gUIdelmes outlmed by UNP In the 
laboratory, varIOUS precautIOns are strIctly followed Students are not allowed to work by 
themselves m certam laboratory envIronments, and are reqUIred to take a specIal safety class 
desIgned for engmeerIng students m the department before accessmg the laboratOrIes Only 
students who have taken a four-hour machme-shop trammg seSSIOn are allowed mto the Gelb 
mach me shop to manufacture parts on the mIlls, lathes and waterJet 
223 TRANSPORTABILITY 
Smce ultImately CASTOR shall be launched from a locatIOn far from MIT, transportatIOn and 
ground support eqUIpment are under conSIderatIOn WeIghmg concerns between transportatIOn 
of a hIghly pressurIzed xenon tank wIth rIsk assocIated wIth havmg students assemblmg the 
satellIte around a pressurIzed tank, the former was chosen ModIficatIOns were made to the 
desIgn to allow msertton of the tank after the majorIty of assembly had taken place, thus 
allowmg the separate transport of satellIte and pressurIzed tank to the launch sIte Ground 
support eqUIpment, mcludmg a carrymg case for the 50kg satellIte, IS currently under desIgn 
2 3 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ALLOCATION 
The general approach to CASTOR IS to break the system down mto manageable subsystems An 
outlme of the CASTOR system usmg Product Breakdown Structure (PBS) IS shown m FIgure 4 
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FIGURE 4 : PBS FOR CASTOR PRIMARY SYSTEM 
The primary responsibilities of these subsystems are described in Table 2. 
TABLE 2: CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBSYSTEMS 
Subsystem Primary Responsibilities 
Avionics Provide computing control for CASTOR 
Communications Communicate data & telemetry back to ground 
station and upload commands to CASTOR 
ADCS/GNC Attitude and control for positioning CASTOR 
Science & Payload Camera for monitoring thruster performance 
Structures Structure to interface with all other subsystems 
and launch vehicle 
Solar Panel Deployment capability 
Thermal Provide thermal control for CASTOR 
including all components 
Power Provide power to CASTOR subsystems 
Propulsion Design and operation of thruster 
Additional aspects of the CASTOR system include the concept of operations, including the 
ground station (both at MIT and through HETE-2 at Cayenne), and interfacing with the launch 
vehicle. Since the primary path to launch involves winning the UNP competition and thus being 
provided with a launch as well as an ESP A ring interface, focus on launch accommodations will 
be a much later stage in the program. As our primary payload is the propulsion system, with the 
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camera as a monitoring device, the CASTOR vehicle is its own payload, and thus separation of 
craft and payload is unnecessary. 
Since CASTOR requirements indicate that thruster degradation and performance must be 
measured, a long mission of approximately one year is envisioned. A useful analysis tool for 
developing this mission is to use a Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) to describe the 
mission over time. The FFBD in Figure 5 shows the top level mission plan from a concept of 
operations perspective, and works down into more detailed levels of operation for the on-orbit 
deployment stage, the commissioning stage, and the normal operations stage. 
TOP LEVEL 
SECOND LEVEL 
I 
(3.0) Ref. I 
On-Orbit 
Deployment I (4.0) Ref. I Commissioning 
t + 
3.1 132 13.3 § 4 3.5 13.5 ~7 
I Communication I~ I System I~ I De-tumble I~ De-tumbfe ~ I Solar PlWIeI I~ I Solar Panel I~ Charge with Ground I Health Check I Checkout I Deployment Pointing I Batlet1es 
SECOND LEVEL 
SECOND LEVEL 
Nonnal (6.0) Ref. 
I
I (5.0) Ref. I I I 
Operations Deconmsslonlng 
i~ ______ t 
§~ r3 1~4 ~~15.7 J Fire ThN6Ier ~ Recharge ~ Communication.... Enter Edlpse ~ Enter Sunlgh ~ Recharge ~ I CommunicatiOn I Batteries with Ground Mode Mode batteries with Ground 
FIGURE 5: FFBD OF MISSION CONOPS 
The normal operations stage shows iteration, in that the mission continues to cycle through 
sunlight and eclipse every 90 minutes, until the satellite ceases for function properly. Only at 
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I 
this point in time IS the satellite decommissioned for destructive re-entry into the Earth's 
atmosphere. 
2.4 SYNTHESIS 
2.4.1 COTS VS. CUSTOM (DEVELOPMENT ITEMS) 
---- --- ------------------- ------------
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) items have become of increasing interest as space-qualified 
components reach the open market. These are defined as items which can be purchased as a unit, 
in quantity (inferring the availability of identical units), and are generally supported by a vendor 
and operated without requiring knowledge of the inner workings of the component. COTS 
components are common in CASTOR. Non-Developmental Items (NDI) are not used in 
CASTOR, due to the program's non-governmental nature. Developmental items (D!), or those 
items custom-designed for CASTOR, are found throughout the project. 
Key design tradeoffs exist between COTS and custom items that must be balanced from the 
program level down to the component level. These decisions can drastically affect operations 
and integration down the road, and thus must be considered in detail. Tradeoffs between COTS 
and DI components are outlined in Table 3. 
TABLE 3: COTS VS . DT TRADEOFFS 
COTS Developmental Item 
Pros • Requires fewer student resources • Flexibility to design to specific 
(less time) needs 
• On-demand spares and • Compatible with system - easy to 
replacements test and integrate 
• Need not re-invent wheel • Often less expensive than 
• Degree of quality purchasing space-qualified 
components 
Cons • Testing/reliability/compatibility • Ties up resources (student time) 
Issues • Students may not have experience 
• Black-box product (no control over to achieve quality of equivalent 
product or little transparency) COTS component 
• Expensive (sometimes) • No space heritage 
• May not be space-qualified 
Time and money are two of the biggest factors which influence design choices to implement 
COTS or DI components. While DI components initially may seem cheaper, in reality student 
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time is not free. The opportunity cost of that student's labor working on furthering the design of 
another system must be considered. Some COTS components are also more reliable, and some 
are also inexpensive. 
A summary of key COTS and custom components is shown below in Table 4. 
TABLE 4: COTS/DI COMPONENTS 
Component COTSIDI Reasoning 
Cathode/Anode DI Mission Requirement 
Thruster 
Solar Panel COTS linear actuator Reliability of deployment is essential, as well as 
Deployment DI release hinge non-deployment during launch, thus COTS linear 
Mechanism actuator provides reliability, while DI release 
hinge provides interface to CASTOR system 
Reaction Wheels COTS Perceived as more accurate & sturdy than student-
built RW; Requires less student time, though 
expenSIve 
Camera COTS camera Camera is inexpensive, however must extensively 
DI casing 
test to ensure space-qualification & survival in 
thrusting environment; Requires modification CDI 
casing) to reduce negative impact of thruster 
plume on lens 
Sun sensors COTS Meets system requirements without increasing 
student workload or going over budget 
2.4.2 REUSE 
--_._------------------
-------------
Reuse of previous designs, and applying lessons learned from them allows for the development 
of an improved system. Graduate students who participated in the FalconSat program as part of 
their undergraduate curriculum have been able to contribute lessons learned to members of 
CASTOR. Experienced team members who have contributed over the life of the project are also 
valuable to the CASTOR program. 
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Since the CASTOR mission involves destructive re-entry as a decommissioning procedure, reuse 
of the vehicle itself is not planned. However, CASTOR designs shall be well-documented in 
order that future satellite designers can utilize them. Heritage components, such as the GPS, sun 
sensors, magnetometer, linear actuators, and reaction wheels, have all been flown in space 
previously. Using heritage components gives more confidence in the reliability of the design. 
Facilities 
Members of CASTOR have access to a number of facilities. Outlined in Figure 6, the potential 
of each facility should be realized, and can be used for multiple purposes. 
CASTOR Facilities 
II=~= II .... GeIb ~ Propulsion , , LllboratDry LllboratDry &8hop 
i Thermal Anechoic Vibration • 
Vacuum Chamber Testing 
Testing Testing 
lathes, Mills Vacuum 
Chamber & Waterjet 
apace 
Iyatlme 
LllboratDry 
I , 
.I , ..! 
Electronics I c.an-' I ADCSTest ~ Fabrication Platform Table Room 
FIGURE 6: FACILITIES 
2.5 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND CONTROL 
-------------------------------_._- ---------_._--------------.---
2.5.1 TRADES 
During the design process the sub-teams often have multiple options as far as components or 
methods to use when fulfilling the requirements. In order to determine which option is best, it is 
necessary to perform a trade study. By identifying the problem, brainstorming different 
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solutions, assessing important criteria, and then comparing the various designs by these criteria 
and their importance, a design decision is achieved. Numerous trade studies have been 
performed over the course of the project. Here is an example to demonstrate the methodology 
with which design decisions are approached. 
Trade Study Example 
Background: Linear Actuator vs. Solenoid for the Solar Panel Release Mechanism 
Originally, the SPRM was planned to be driven by a pull-type solenoid, not a linear 
actuator. A solenoid would be very similar in function to a linear actuator: once current 
flows to the solenoid, it would retract its solenoid pin, just like the linear actuator. In fact, 
solenoids are often used for one-time releases like this application. Solenoids are simpler 
- and therefore more reliable - than linear actuators, and usually much less expensive. 
However, a linear actuator offers distinct advantages over a solenoid. For one, linear 
actuators can be more mass efficient than solenoids of similar sizes. In addition, a linear 
actuator exerts a relatively constant force throughout its stroke, whereas the force a 
solenoid exerts on its pin is proportional to the fraction of the pin inside the solenoid. 
This is especially important to consider, given that for this application, the maximum 
force is needed in the beginning at the largest extension of the pin. 
But by far the most significant advantage of a motorized linear actuator over a solenoid is 
the fact that the motion of the solenoid's pin cannot as easily be constrained before 
release. The linear actuator's pin is often held in place with a stiff mechanical locking 
system, whereas solenoid pins are generally held in place with springs and can therefore 
move more easily during launch. Because of this problem, using a solenoid increases the 
risk of premature deployment of the solar panels and failure of the SPRM. 
For these reasons, a motorized linear actuator will be used instead of a solenoid. 
The chart below, similar to a Pugh chart, is the type of trade comparison done which was 
described in the paragraphs above. The characteristics of the component are listed as well as the 
level of importance of each characteristic. Then the components are compared on each category 
on a scale from 1 to 5, 5 being preferred. In this case the linear actuator was chosen over the 
solenoid because it performed better in the driving category of minimizing risk, and the total 
score took importance weighting into account. Even though the solenoid was cheaper, simpler 
and more reliable, it did not have the same level of safety which is most important when 
preventing premature panel deployment during launch. 
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Characteristic Importance Solenoid Rank Linear Actuator Rank 
Simplicity Med 4 3 
Cost Low 3 2 
Reliability Med 5 4 
Mass Med 2 4 
Risk High 2 5 
(Premature 
Deployment) 
TOTAL 31 39 
2.5.2 RISK MANAGEMENT 
In order to mitigate risk, potential difficulties must be identified, quantified, tracked and 
analyzed. A risk tracking spreadsheet (see Appendix 9.4) serves as the backbone of CASTOR's 
risk management system. These require continuous monitoring and thorough analysis for the 
purpose of risk reduction. 
2.5.2.1 DEFINING RISK 
Risk: The inability to achieve mission objectives - comprised of failure probability and 
consequences [I}. 
There are several types of risk. In order to consider them, a careful definition was determined by 
consulting NASA, Air Force, and MIT documentation [1,4]. Programmatic risk consists of any 
risk involving the program, including all external and internal risk. Subsets of programmatic risk 
include technical risk, cost risk, and schedule risk. Tradeoffs between the types of risk constitute 
risk management. Risks differ from issues in that they are problems that have not yet occurred. 
Once a risk becomes a reality, it is an issue and requires immediate action. 
Successful risk management comes from continuous work. In order to mitigate risk, careful 
identification, analysis and tracking must be completed to ensure safety. 
The management process can be broken into stages: 
1) Planning 
2) Assessment 
3) Handling 
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4) Monitoring 
Risk planning involves creating a framework to identify and track risks, along with their 
mitigation strategies. Documentation, such as the risk management file in Appendix 0, falls 
under this category. Planning also includes scheduled meetings with team leads to discuss risks. 
Assessment consists of the actual identification and analysis of risks, including their likelihood 
and perceived consequence. Assessments are generally conducted by subsystem personnel, at 
the request of risk management managers. Updating the documentation created in the planning 
stage is a part of assessment. 
Risk handling is the response to risk assessment. It involves distribution of responsibility of risk 
mitigation, to team leads for instances, as well as a plan forward to reduce or respond to risks. 
Higher risk items shall be brought to the attention of everyone in the systems team to increase 
involvement. 
Finally, risk monitoring is the process by which the entire system risk is checked, allowing for a 
comparison to metrics to show improvement. This allows one to see the effectiveness of risk 
handling measures. For CASTOR, the current metric is 'risk level,' measured as a function of 
likelihood and consequence. Each risk item receives a score from 1-5 for both likelihood and 
severity of consequence (5 being extremely likely or catastrophic). Risks are considered 
improved as risks decrease in levels. 
FIGURE 7: RISK LEVEL - LIKELIHOOD VS. CONSEQUENCE 
The above chart depicts the five levels of likelihood and risk, and shows the breakdown into risk 
level. Green indicates low risk, yellow medium risk, and red shows high risk. By this point in 
the design, there should be no high risk items, as risk items should flow in the direction of the 
arrow. Monitoring helps in tracking this flow. 
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2.5.2.2 APPROACH 
By improving CASTOR's management process, risk shall be reduced. The implemented system 
includes a tracking spreadsheet and a process of listing components and their technical risks. 
The last person to update the item is also tracked in the system. 
An initial project-wide risk assessment was completed to determine where components stand and 
what areas needed additional focus. This involved contacting leaders of each subsystem and 
discussing risks and mitigation strategies. Next, further progress was made by discussing the list 
of risks with team leads to increase the robustness of the spreadsheet. 
Further enhancement of the risk management spreadsheet is an ongoing process. Care must be 
taken not to overload the process by delving too deeply into compounded problems 
(combinations of failures) , and to focus on the most critical risks. While initially adding risks to 
the database was encouraged, feedback from CDR showed that risks should be limited to twenty 
or thirty important risks , rather than nearly a hundred detailed risks. Thus the database is 
undergoing reduction to produce a more condensed form that brings focus to the true concerns 
for the project. 
2.5 .2.3 ASSESSMENT MODEL 
Various characteristics of risk should be tracked to gain a sense of risks. These include the area 
of risk (hardware, software, operational, programmatic, manufacture, transport, etc.), the risk 
dependency (what else must fail first) , likelihood, consequence, mitigation, diagnostic, and repair 
or backup method. Subsystems are asked to self-report estimates of their risks and address these 
categories. In considering risks, personnel should be aware that critical changes that affect 
multiple systems can have far-reaching effects. These can cause other subsystems to make 
numerous changes to their system and thus increases risk level. Since the level of risk is 
measured by the likelihood and consequence, changes such as this increase the consequence 
level and thus are reflected in the tracking process . 
Relationships between risks are shown as 'dependencies. ' Direct links between subsystems can 
lead to similar probabilities, and a simplification of risk tracking. 
Consistency is somewhat maintained between subsystems, as team members updating the 
spreadsheet are asked to consider the following scheme: 
TABLE 5: RISK LEVELS LEGEND 
MIT CASTOR NASA ESMD Paper Page 25 
2 - 1% Causes difficulties/delays, but can be corrected or dealt with 
3 - 10% Compromises mission 
4 - 25% Mission Failure or Partial Mission Failure 
5 - 50% Injures people or harms launch vehicle & payloads; 
Total Mission Failure 
Further work should involve tracking the assurance level of the evaluator (whether this is a tested 
likelihood or a complete guess). 
2.5.2.4 TECHNICAL RISK 
Currently all teams have updated the risk assessment spreadsheet. Some teams failed to fill in all 
requested information, and work is being conducted to track down answers to these missing 
pieces. Each item is looked at individually and considered for thoroughness. Higher risk items 
are initially flagged so as to prioritize them. Currently higher-risk items (level six or seven) 
include the anode (high voltage affecting system), and camera lens degradation. The next set of 
high risk items includes magnetometer failure, schedule slips, reaction wheel malfunctions, 
torque coil failures, solar panel deployment failure, and others. Mitigation strategies range from 
using the engine to de-saturate to modifying the duty cycle to account for low power input. 
Meetings with subsystem team members can provide additional insight into potential risks. A 
meeting with the Power team took place to discover the relationship between power and voltage 
converter failures and various components. A single converter failure could cause an entire 
system, for instance ADCS, to become inoperable. Since most ADCS components work on 5V 
power, only the torque coils will operate should there be a failure. Thus analysis of the 
discussion also led to the discovery of unlisted risks, such as inhibits, and the difference between 
the battery charging circuit and the MPPT. Careful checking must be conducted to avoid errors, 
and to discover relationships between failures. 
2.5.2.5 COST ESTIMATE 
Assessment of costs is more straightforward, in that spending has been tracked over the last year 
and a spreadsheet has been implemented to track expenditures. Details regarding expenditures 
are tracked. Income, or available funds, is constrained, and shall be determined based on a 
detailed cost projection plan (see Appendix 9.3). The current method for dealing with this 
limitation is to delay the purchase of expensive, high TRL components, and instead test with 
engineering mockups until funding can be secured. It has been noted that for FCR in January, 
does not expect a flight-ready satellite, but a proto-flight satellite. Instead, high-cost flight 
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hardware can be purchased later, as long as the interfaces and controllability can be modeled. 
For instance, purchase of one reaction wheel and a demonstration of functionality will suffice, 
rather than purchasing (and integrating) all three reaction wheels. Functionality of the other two 
reaction wheel should be verified by integrating engineering models into the system. This 
provides the advantage of reduced cost as well as sufficient testing. 
Summary of Cost Risks: 
Limited Budget 
o Consequence: students spend excessive amounts of time re-creating COTS 
components to reduce costs; adverse effect on schedule adherence 
o Dependent on stringent monetary control and limited donations 
o Mitigation: Ask companies for material donations (such as solar cells) to reduce 
costs while not impacting student workload 
Exceeding budget 
o Consequence: Strain on resources; could lead to lack of funding for testing and 
manufacture of satellite, as well as purchase of components 
o Dependant on insufficient tracking and spending policies; inability to accurately 
project costs 
o Mitigation: include margining in cost projections; outline of all large-cost items & 
cost estimates; delay purchase of expensive items until funding is secured; test 
with less costly 'engineering units' 
Lack of funding for testing and manufacture of satellite 
o Consequence: serious delays which will adversely affect progress along UNP 
schedule 
o Dependencies: insufficient funds (lack of donors); going over budget 
o Mitigation: Promote satellite to potential donors; careful not to drastically exceed 
budget 
Other methods for dealing with cost risk that are already under implementation include cost 
margining and purchasing restrictions. Costly items must be approved by faculty and staff. 
Garrett Fritz has done some work on cost projection modeling for the future of the program. 
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2.5.2.6 SCHEDULE RISK 
Throughout the project great attention has been given to compiling schedules from teams and 
integrating them with a systems master schedule. Freeze dates have been created to help track 
design phases and keep teams at the same stage in design. Essentially the chosen method for 
reducing schedule-slip risk involves early identification of slips, re-working of schedule to 
reflect realistic delays (and flow-down to other systems), and reallocation of labor and resources 
to meet changing demands. Margins in the schedule allow for improved schedule-tracking, 
along with advanced freeze dates and compilation deadlines. Sub-teams are additionally 
encouraged to adhere to the schedule by taking part in schedule creation and thus being held 
responsible. Additional information on schedule can be found in Appendix 9.5. 
TABLE 6: SCHEDULE ITEMS OUTLINE 
Item Risk Level 
(Iow/med/h igh) 
Design Document Draft (4/23) Low 
Integrate Power w/Avionics Med 
(4/29) 
Design GSE (5/7) Low 
PPU Testing (5/7) Med 
2.5.3 BUDGET MANAGEMENT 
The Systems team also tracks the purchase orders that are submitted to the professor and is 
responsible for ordering components and updates the MEL part status to "delivered". 
Additionally, a systems team member must approve all purchases before submission to the 
professor. Purchases are approved only if the component is listed on the MEL. This provides a 
method of cross-checking to avoid unnecessary purchases. 
The accrued costs of all purchased items are being tracked, not just those of flight hardware. An 
item is added to the spending tracking sheet once the purchase order has been approved, not 
when the actual debt has been incurred. This allows the team to anticipate the need to request 
more funding in a timely manner, should it become necessary. The Systems team must approve 
purchase orders in order to prevent unauthorized purchases. A student who wishes to purchase 
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hardware must completely fill out a standardized Purchase Order or PO form. This PO is then 
checked on the MEL to verify the part is accounted for. If it is, then the PO is submitted to the 
purchasing professor for ordering. If the part is not accounted for in the MEL, then it must first 
be submitted for approval to the MEL before being approved for purchase. If it is subsequently 
added to the MEL, the PO will then be accepted. 
This past March each sub-team provided a list of components that still need to be purchased 
before FCR next January. An estimated $101 ,108.64 of hardware and test expenditures IS 
anticipated through FCR. A more short-term cost projection can be found in Appendix 9.3. 
2.5.4 INTERFACE MANAGEMENT 
Given the complexity of the CASTOR system, interface control documents (ICDs) are used to 
assist in modeling interfaces to ease integration efforts. The purpose of an ICD is to document 
and explain all of the possible inputs to and all potential outputs from a system or subsystem. 
This documentation is helpful not only for the future user of the system, but also for each sub-
team designing the system. These documents help the designers determine what information 
they need to request from each team as well as how their design changes may affect the other 
teams. 
Below is a template for the MIT format ICD as well as explanations for each component. 
Formatting is often times just as important as the technical content because improper formatting 
can easily make the technical message confusing or completely not interpretable. 
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what systems this reD 
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Applicable Documents 
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expected audience is not 
familiar with them or do 
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Storage: The ICDs which are available for editing by the sub-teams are stored in the CASTOR 
fileshare. This is where the sub-teams can view their ICDs and make changes as they see fit. 
When the sub-teams want to submit these changed ICDs for approval they send them to their 
systems team liaison. The systems teams performs an initial screening of the ICDs and also 
passes them on to T As who can point out any missed mistakes. Once the inconsistencies have 
been fixed, the ICDs are then placed in the UNP section under 4.2.4.2-Documenation-ICDs 
which will eventually be submitted to UNP. 
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Subteam edits 
leo 
Systems 
Reviews leo 
Systems 
commit s leo 
to liIeshare 
Graduate lAs provide 
feedback on leo 
FIGURE 8: ICD REVIEW PROCESS 
Tracking Changes: When an rCD is edited the author needs to list the date of change as well as 
the topic of change in the "Revision History" section of the lCD itself. This way, when the 
document is reviewed, any questions can be directed to the original author. This facilitates ease 
and speed of the lCD change approval process. 
Types of leDs 
The Mechanical lCD identifies the hardware for the system or subsystem, and identifies to what 
it will be connected. For each piece of hardware, the lCD contains three main subsections: lCD 
Block Diagram, Physical Envelopes, and Hardware Mounting. The lCD Block Diagram 
identifies and shows all critical interfaces for the item. The Physical Envelopes section gives the 
initial (and, if applicable, [mal) current best estimate dimensions of the item: length, width, 
height, volume, and mass. The Hardware Mounting section provides a CAD drawing (if 
applicable) of each item, and describes the surface location, the hole locations, and the mounting 
hardware to be used. For many pieces of hardware, a fourth subsection, modeling, is included; 
this section describes any analysis (e.g. CAD drawings, finite element analysis) that was used. 
The Power lCD identifies the hardware necessary to power each system or subsystem, and 
identifies to what the hardware will be connected. The lCD contains four subsections: lCD Block 
Diagram, Connector Pin Out/In Matrix, Grounding, and Load. The lCD Block Diagram 
identifies and shows all interfaces and connections for the hardware. The Connector Pin Out/In 
Matrix lists the in and out pins used for each connection, as well as the amount of amperage 
passing through the connections. Diagrams of the pin connections are included. The Grounding 
section identifies the type of grounding connections (i.e. analog, digital, or both). The Load 
section identifies the amount of power each piece of hardware will receive during the mission, 
and how often the power will be received. 
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The Thermal lCD identifies the surface connections (i.e. metal on metal contact) for each system 
or subsystem. The lCD contains four subsections: lCD Block Diagram, Heat Transfer Method, 
Thermal Path, Heat Loads and Fluxes, and Modeling. The lCD Block Diagram identifies the 
connections between the surfaces. The Heat Transfer Method section defines the method of heat 
transfer that will take place, the Thermal Path section identifies the path the heat load will travel, 
and the Heat Loads and Fluxes section identifies the amount of heat load that will be transferred 
during the mission, as well as the hardware limits. The Modeling section lists the types of 
analyses used. 
The Data lCD identifies the hardware for each subsystem and to what it will be connected. For 
each piece of hardware, the lCD contains four sections: lCD Block Diagram, Connector Pin 
Out/In Matrix, Software Protocol, and Data Load. The lCD Block Diagram shows all interfaces 
and connections between the hardware. The Connector Pin Out/In Matrix lists the physical pin or 
socket connections for each piece of hardware, and whether the connection is in or out, as well as 
the voltage and amperage of each connection. The Software Protocol section describes how the 
software will interact with the hardware, and the Data Load section lists the type and amount of 
data that will flow between the hardware, and how often, during the mission. 
Interface Diagram 
The following diagram provides a visual representation of the relationships between all of the 
sub-teams and the subsequent lCDs which need to be managed for each relationship. 
Pre-Launch Interface Diagram 
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FIGURE 9: INTERFACES DIAGRAM 
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255 DATA MANAGEMENT 
All of the CASTOR Command MedIa IS stored on a subversIon reposItory whIch IS broken down 
as follows 
• Management 
• Systems 
• Subteams 
• Shared 
Each of these sectIOns has dIfferent levels of access Sub-team folders, for example, offer space 
for each of the systems to work on theIr command medIa before submIttmg It to systems for 
approval The systems team then makes the determmatton of whether or not that document IS 
ready for submIssIon to UNP Those final documents are then stored m a systems level folder 
The structure of the reposItory prevents multIple edItors from overwntmg changes If they are 
workmg on a document at the same tIme If there IS a conflIcted copy then the reposItory WIll 
advIse the author to update to the newest verSIOn before submIttmg theIr changes 
CASTOR DesIgn Document 
The CASTOR desIgn document provIdes detatled descnpttons for all aspects of the desIgn 
process for each sub-team It explams both the techmcal concepts, team orgamzatton and 
development processes for everythmg mc1udmg desIgn, schedule, budget, scope, testmg, 
manufactunng, etc ThIS document WIll be compIled at the end of the semester and wIll proVIde 
both a work hIStOry for the semester and a sense of the current status and future work whIch 
needs to be done TransIttomng a project between one group of engmeers and another allows 
presents a challenge, one whIch CASTOR faces each semester, as mformatton regardmg desIgn 
decIsIOns can be lost and experts are replaced wIth nOVIces The desIgn document attempts to 
mIttgate these tranSItIon dIfficulttes, by provIdmg a means of passmg desIgn mformatIon to new 
members and thus helps wIth project contmUlty 
Engmeenng Change Orders 
An Engmeenng Change Order CECO) IS the documentatton process followed to Implement 
SIgnIficant changes that affect multIple subsystems Its purpose IS to ensure contmUlty of desIgn 
and to resolve potentIal conflIcts WhIch may anse from the desIgn changes The ECO creatIOn 
process serves as a mmI-reVIew for SIgnIficant changes so that all the sub-teams are on the same 
page ThIS process IS to 
o Dehver the proposed ECO to all dIrectly affected subsystems for reVIew 
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o Subsystems change specifics and inform the systems team 
o Deliver the current proposed ECO to all other teams for review 
o Check with systems team again 
o Perform a sign-off of the ECO at a team leads meeting 
This process managed by "ECO Manager" member of Systems Team who is responsible for 
making sure that all relevant parties are committed to the new design change before it is signed 
off. There have been six ECOs throughout the CASTOR program and there have been none so 
far this semester. However, the process is still in place in case significant changes still need to 
be made. 
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• 
CASTOR ECO# 
ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER 002 
OrIginator IOalll Submitted ECO SlIItus Revision 
R. Mclinko 12009/11/03 ISubmitted 01 
Changing Elements 
ADCS System Design 
Reason For Change 
The current nitrogen gas system has been shown to be inadequate to correct for disturbance torques throughout the 
operational life of the satellite. Furthenmore, it is much hea"er and more complicated than other options . 
DescripdonofChange 
The key elements of the change are as follows : 
-The nitrogen gas system of the satellite is remo~ 
-Two reaction wheels are added to the satellite, orthogonal to the existing one 
-Three torque coils are added to the satell ite in mutually orthogonal directions 
-The spacecraft is allowed to "tumble" during ecl ipse 
-The engine gimbal system is remo"ld 
-A magnet is added opposite the structure 
-The magnet and reaction wheels will be used to replace the engine gimbal system 
ECO Board Members Signatura Dalll Comments 
ECO Manager 
Operations Lead 
ADCS Lead 
A"onics Lead 
Communications Lead 
Propulsion Lead 
Power Lead 
Thenmal Lead 
Structures Lead 
ECO Manager NoIIIs 
FIGURE 10: SAMPLE ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER (ECO) 
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2 5 6 MASS MANAGEMENT (MEL) 
The mass budget for CASTOR IS tracked through the use of the Master EqUIpment LISt or MEL 
ThIs lIst IS an Excel Spreadsheet documentmg components eIther on the flIght model of the 
satellIte or used for testmg It also tracks components that stIll need to be acqUIred 
Each sub-team has a dedIcated sectIOn of the MEL Through regular meetmgs wIth Systems and 
the team leads, the MEL IS always an up to date representatIon of the components on the 
satellIte When any component IS updated on the MEL the person responsIble for the change 
WIll document hIS name and the date onto that component's row so that others can venfy the 
change m the future Each team can use the MEL to IdentIfy partIcular part numbers or types of 
components used by other teams should they need to mterface wIth them m theIr desIgns 
The MEL has the abIlIty to hold mass margms for every component lIsted The margmmg 
scheme IS 
Exact (0-5%) 
Mass component has been weIghed and mtegrated mto the satellIte 
Fme EstImate (5%-10%) 
The mass has been quoted by the manufacturer or found on a specIficatIOn sheet 
Coarse EstImate (15% - 35%) 
Number based on SMAD or other approxImatIOn not yet venfied by 
manufacturer 
Guess (35% +) 
The component IS stIll largely unknown, such as bolts/nuts m the current desIgn 
2 5 7 TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE 
One Important aspect of system control mvolves quantIfymg techmcal performance of 
components In order to measure progress and IdentIfy system weaknesses, trackmg of the 
TechnologIcal Readmess Level (TRL) of components was Implemented Before deSIgn freezes, 
as well as at vanous scheduled tImes m the program, each Item IS revIewed to assess ItS TRL, 
based on the NASA TRL chart shown m FIgure 11 
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System test, launch, 
and operations 
System/subsystem 
development 
Technology 
demonstration 
Technology 
development 
Research to prove 
feasibility 
Basic technology 
research 
TRl9 Actual system "flight proven" through successful 
mission operations 
Actual system completed and "flight qualified" through 
test and demonstration (ground or flight) 
System prototype demonstration in a 
target/space environment 
System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration 
in a relevant environment (ground or space) 
Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant 
environment 
Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory 
environment 
Analytical and experimental critical function and/or 
characteristic proof-of-concept 
Technology concept and/or application formulated 
Basic principles observed and reported 
FIGURE II: NASA TECHNOLOGICAL READINESS LEVEL ASSESSMENT TOOL (1) 
Since most CASTOR components have no space heritage, a TRL of 6 is the upper bound for 
qualification and the target for systems leading to FCR. Listing the TRL of the critical 
components (Table 7) provides a technical overview of the CASTOR system. 
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TABLE 7: CRITICAL COMPONENTS TRL 
Component TRL 
Sun Sensors 9 
Reaction Wheels 9 
PIC Communications 5 
Thruster 5 
Power Processing Unit (PPU) 4 
Antenna 3 
Camera 3 
TRL incorporates the testing of the component into a metric. For instance, taking a system and 
putting it through thermal vacuum chamber testing might increase the TRL of the system, should 
it perform as expected. Should an item fail a test, it also fails to move up the TRL scale until the 
root of the problem is corrected. By monitoring both the TRL and the risk level of a component, 
efforts can be focused on low TRL, high risk (or critical) components, allowing for efficient 
allocation of resources. 
3 TRANSITIONING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES 
This section describes how key technologies were chosen and integrated into CASTOR and what 
risks stem from them. 
3.1 DIVERGING CUSPED-FIELD THRUSTER 
Criteria 
The propulsion system onboard CASTOR will use electric propulsion to propel the small 
satellite. Using the Diverging Cusped Field Thruster (DCFT) as its primary propulsion system, 
CASTOR must operate for throughout the mission lifetime of 1500 hours. Hence, the propulsion 
system must likewise be operable for the same amount of time so that on-orbit performance, 
efficiency, and degradation of the DCFT can be measured and compared to thrusters of similar 
technologies. 
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The DCFT is believed to have better overall performance and lifetime than other electric 
thrusters for the following reasons: 
• No central body 
• Improved anode design 
• Better plasma confinement 
• Use of permanent magnets as opposed to electromagnets 
For these reasons, it was chosen as the propulsion system for CASTOR. The purpose of the 
mission will be to validate the performance. 
Activities 
The thruster being used on CASTOR is a Diverging Cusped Field Thruster that was designed by 
Dan Courtney, a graduate student at MIT. A prototype of this thruster was built by MIT students 
in the spring of2008 and it was modified and tested the in the summer of2008. The thruster uses 
Xenon propellant and will produce an Isp that scales with the amount of power sent to the 
thruster. For this mission, the thruster will be operating with an Isp around 1200 s. 
The thrust that is produced by the thruster also scales positively with the amount of power given 
to the thruster. Testing at 162.6 W (the previous operating power of the thruster), the thruster 
produces .0071 N of thrust. However, our new operating power for the DCFT is 100 W, but 
thrust output tests at this power have yet to be completed. The thruster will be fired continuously 
while CASTOR is in sunlight and will be turned off during eclipse periods. The engine's heater 
that runs at 36 W will remain running during eclipse periods in order to prevent the need for 
reconditioning when the satellite enters sunlight periods again. However, we are currently 
looking into ways to conserve power by not operating the heater during eclipse but instead 
running the keeper in the cathode, which uses only 15 W of power. 
The cathode is part of the electric propulsion engine and the DCFT. The cathode emits charged 
particles that interact with the Xenon particles leaving the thruster to neutralize them and create a 
plasma beam leaving the engine. A cathode identical to the one used for thruster tests will be 
purchased from Busek, Inc. The cathode must be run with 15 W of power whenever the thruster 
is firing. The DCFT is shown in Figure 12. 
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FIGURE 12: SOLIDWORKS DESIGN OF THRUSTER 
Risks 
The primary risk inherent in the DCFT is that it is still in the development and characterization 
stage. Not only does this lead to technical risks, but also programmatic risks in that there are 
many unknowns and fabrication/testing could lead to schedule slips. The primary technical risks 
include poisoning of the cathode, failure of the heaterikeeper, anode material degradation, and 
lack of power to the anode. Each of these risks is being mitigated as much as possible at this 
point, but this is largely in flux due to the current testing of the DCFT. 
3.2 XENON FEED SYSTEM 
Criteria 
The criteria for choosing the Xenon Feed System (XFS) were primarily based around: 
• Functionality of the system 
• Mass of the components 
• Cost of the components 
• Risk of the system 
It should be noted that the alternative to the XFS is a custom feed system that was developed by 
the CASTOR team. This system had a mass of nearly double that of the XFS. Furthermore, the 
system is provided to CASTOR by NASA at no cost and the XFS will be extensively tested prior 
to being delivered to the CASTOR program. 
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Activities 
The feed system is the controller for the mass flow rate of Xenon gas into the cathode and DCFT 
(anode) of the propulsion system, as seen in Figure 13. It regulates the flow ensuring the 
optimum amount of xenon continues through the system so that the maximum amount of xenon 
ions are produced when the gas flows through the DCFT creating the most efficient use of the 
propellant. 
FIGURE 13: NAS A XENON FEED SYSTEM 
The NASA system, seen in Figure 13, was developed by Gray Research and NASA and is 
currently still in a testing phase at NASA with a last reported Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) of 5. It weighs 0.73 kg in total, taking in gas at an inlet pressure of 3000 psi and releasing 
it at 15 psi. The system can regulate the flow between 0 and 10 sccm. Due to thermal expansion 
and contraction the Pressure Control Module (PCM) that Castor will be using as its primary flow 
control device has a constrained operation temperature of 0-50 degrees Celsius under normal 
operation from 30-3000 psi inflow to the module. As temperature increases above the operating 
range, the feed system begins to a have small steady state error in its control loop response with 
little response time variation and good stability nonetheless. 
Risks 
Given that the XFS is being provided to the CASTOR program by NASA, it is projected to have 
a much lower level of technical risk due to the construction and testing it will undergo by 
professionals. However, delivery by NASA also implies significant programmatic and schedule 
risk given that NASA may fail to meet CASTOR program deadlines. Technical risks include 
xenon feed rate not being accurate and inability to adjust mass flow rate into the thruster. 
Mitigations for these risks are being explored and developed, but much of this will continue as 
the XFS is integrated into the propulsion system. 
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3.3 SOLAR PANEL DEPLOYMENT 
Criteria 
Given the UNP's requirement of surviving 20G loading, the mechanisms connecting each solar 
panel to the primary structure of the satellite must be able to withstand a certain load to meet that 
requirement and survive launch. Specifically, if each Solar Panel is estimated to have 
approximately 1kg of mass (an upper estimate, based on mock-up models), then all of the 
brackets connecting to each Solar Panel must support 200N of force in total without failing. 
Assuming that each solar panel will be supported by 6 or more connectors and approximately 
equal loading distribution, each connector must therefore be able to support at least 34N. 
In addition, because deployable solar panels are necessary to meet minimum power 
requirements, a mechanism for reliably deploying 2 of the solar panels must be included. 
Furthermore, given that the solar array deployment is critical for complete achievement of the 
CASTOR mission, it is necessary that the mechanism be able to deploy with high reliability. 
More importantly, it must be able to not deploy in the Launch Vehicle environment and therefore 
potentially endanger other payloads. 
Activities 
In designing a new Solar Panel Release Mechanism (SPRM), the following factors were 
considered: (1) striving for simplicity to maximize the probability of successful Solar Panel 
deployment; (2) lowering mass and power requirements to minimize impact on the mass and 
power budgets; (3) incorporating a reasonable margin for error, (4) ease of manufacturing. 
Each SPRM will be driven by a linear actuator. Once activated, the actuator will retract its pin, 
after which the two solar panel pins attached to each of the adjacent Solar Panels will be 
released. Then, with the help of an external spring mechanism, the Solar Panels will be able to 
deploy. This SPRM will constrain the deploying Solar Panels in the X, Y, and Z directions and 
will be much more robust than the previous release mechanism. 
The SPRM will consist of the following components: 2 solar panel pins, I linear actuator, and 
one bracket to hold everything together and attach the mechanism to the primary structure. The 
bracket will be made of several 1/4" and 1/8" thick aluminum extrusions for ease of fabrication. 
There will be two SPRMs in total, all located on the farthest point of Truss I in the -Z direction. 
The SPRM, if made from 6061 Aluminum, has a mass of 0.08kg including the full linear 
actuator assembly. 
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FIGURE 14: SOLAR PANEL RELEASE MECHANISM 
THE SECOND ITERATION OF THE SOLAR PANEL RELEASE MECHANISM, SIDE VIEW (LEFT) , 
ISOMETRIC VIEW (CENTER), BOTTOM VIEW (RIGHT) . THE CURRENT DESIGN INCORPORATES AN 
INDUSTRY LINEAR ACTUATOR AND IS MORE MASS EFFICIENT. 
Risks 
The primary risk of the deployment system is that the deployment mechanism fails during launch 
and therefore puts other payloads at risk. Since this is an unacceptable occurrence, it is 
necessary to ensure the deployment system is designed with high safety factor, contains as much 
redundancy as possible, and is extensively tested. The second main risk is that the deployment 
system will fail to deploy when on-orbit. This is also mitigated primarily through testing since 
failure to deploy would result in a serious penalty to mission objectives. 
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4 INTEGRATION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING EFFORT 
4.1 REVIEWS AND FREEZES 
During production there comes various times where the design must be reviewed and checked. 
Attendees to these reviews include professors, people in industry, and University Nanosatellite 
reviewers. For reviews it is important that every team member is operating with the most up to 
date information. Thus, design freezes are implemented for these reviews typically two weeks in 
advance. 
At the reviews, each part of the design of the CASTOR satellite is reviewed and comments are 
noted and addressed. After each review, a Systems compiled list of action items collected from 
the review is sent out to each team, informing them of what changes must be implemented into 
our design with a priority set on each one. 
Additionally, design freezes serve as a method for checking in with each team. It is easy for 
teams to lose track of what changes have been made to the design if they are not directly related 
to their section of the satellite. Because of this there can be mistakes made when moving 
forward as teams may design for out of date components. When the design is frozen, there are 
updated data sheets, design documents, equipment lists and other command media Systems 
manages that are available to each sub-team as a point of reference as the project moves forward. 
4.2 CONCURRENT ENGINEERING OF HARDW ARE/SOFTW ARE 
Both hardware and software for CASTOR are constantly evolving. As such, it is important to 
make sure that any changes in either aspect of design is tracked and noted. Most of the 
interfaces between hardware and software fall under the responsibility of the avionics sub-team 
managed by the systems team. The hardware provides the physical connections and logic 
circuits necessary for connecting to sensors and actuating devices. The software provides the 
logic for ensuring that the sensor data is acted upon properly. 
When a sub-team determines that they require a hardware component for their operations and 
need to control it, they inform the Systems who will make assign responsibility to someone on 
avionics. However, if any changes are made to either the physical component or the type of 
software implementation, it is crucial that both the avionics team and team responsible for the 
component are kept up to date. This is done through the team leads meetings as well as direct 
communication with Systems and the sub-teams throughout the week. 
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4.3 SUBSYSTEM TESTS , INTEGRATED TESTS , PLANNED INTEGRATION 
PERIODS 
Since the design of the CASTOR satellite is relatively mature, each team is now taking on the 
task of integration with other teams. During this phase of design it is particularly important for 
team communication to be facilitated through the Systems Team. When sub-teams need to 
schedule joint lab time they can submit their requests at the team leads meetings held by Systems 
each week. 
The integrated testing is managed by the Systems team to allow for streamlined operation during 
the test. Integrated tests include thermal vacuum and shake table tests were components from 
multiple teams are integrated. These tests take place off MIT campus at MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory. In order to reserve time at these labs the tests must be scheduled ahead of time and 
must have sufficient personnel to run the experiments. 
4.4 CRITICAL PATH MANAGEMENT 
One approach that CASTOR has used to improve 
the robustness of schedule management is to 
introduce Critical Path Management (CPM). A 
simple Gantt chart shows the expected run time of 
each task or project and displays them against a 
calendar. This is useful for visualizing the time 
breakdown of individual tasks but this does not give 
very much insight to a program manager as to what 
tasks may be high risk for creating a bottleneck in 
the process if they aren 't completed in time. 
Critical path management displays each task as a 
FIGURE 15: CRITICAL PATH 
MANAGEMENT 
state in a state diagram and lists the expected early start, early finish, late start and late finish 
times. This state diagram incorporates dependencies that certain tasks have with others. For 
example, the Master Equipment List (MEL) cannot be finished and submitted until ADCS 
determines which brand of sun sensor to use. If the systems team is constantly aware of these 
dependencies then they will know the extent of the consequences if, say, the ADCS team falls 
behind. Once this state flow is created the critical path can be determined. The critical path is 
defined as the flow path through the states from project start to finish which, in total, takes the 
longest time to complete. 
This gives the program manager a visual reference to decide if they want to shuffle tasks around 
to have more risk adverse schedule. More complicated forms of CPM can morph into PERT 
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analysis and Design Space Matrices (DSM) which incorporate possible design iterations into the 
schedule. These have not yet been incorporated into the program. 
5 IMPLEMENTATION TASKS 
5. 1 TESTING 
The CASTOR satellite must undergo extensive testing to create mission assurance. Mission 
assurance is defined as the general system engineering, quality, and management principles 
towards the goal of achieving mission success, and, toward this goal, provides confidence in its 
achievement. Mission success is defined as the achievement of a system to singularly or in 
combination meet not only specified performance requirements, but also expectations of the 
users and operators in terms of safety, operability, suitability, and supportability. Mission 
assurance focuses on the detailed engineering of the acquired system, and, toward this objective, 
uses independent technical assessments as a cornerstone throughout the entire concept and 
requirement definition, design, development, production, test, deployment, and operation phases. 
There are three key reasons why a test should be performed. These reasons and the rationale 
behind them are listed below. 
1 Functionality verification 
1.1 Evaluate that the as-built system (including interfaces) satisfies the requirements and 
specification baseline. 
1.2 Identify issues with the proposed test, integration, and verification plans and 
procedures 
2 Reduce Risk 
2.1 Evaluate appropriateness and risk of verification by any method other than testing. 
2.2 Evaluate risks associated with deviations from environmental testing standards (e.g., 
MIL-STD 1540) and other applicable standards or best practices. 
2.3 Evaluate the fidelity to the "test like you fly" (TL YF) and "test what you fly" 
philosophies, especially at the system and higher levels of integration, and identify 
risks associated with deviations from these philosophies. This includes implications 
to accurate modeling and simulation. 
3 Unfamiliar Area 
3.1 Evaluate analysis, simulation, inspection, and test results to determine readiness to 
proceed to subsequent test or program activities. 
All testing will follow begin at the component level, progress through the subsystem level, and 
finish at the assembly level. There may be additional tests between the three major levels, but as 
a minimum, all aspects of the design will be tested in this order for the reasons listed above. 
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All test plans can be found m the assocIated test plans The three system level tests are the 
Balloon SHOT (II), VIbratIon, and Thermal Vacuum test and are lIsted wIth the subsystem 
performmg them 
-
5 1 1 INDEX OF TESTS 
• AVIOnICS 
o EMC/EMI August 2010 
o FlatSat I (Ground statIOn CommUnICatIOns) November 2009 
o FlatSat II (Read ThermallPower Sensor Data) May 2010 
o FlatSat III (Read/Operate ACS sensors) May 2010 
o FlatSat IV (PPU/Lmear Actuators/InhIbIts) May 2010 
o FlatSat V (Operate XFS) May 2010 
o FlatSat VI (RadIatIOn effects) May 2010 
o Balloon SHOT (II) June II_13th 2010 
• CommUnICatIOns 
o Antenna Apnl2010 
• ACS 
o GPS November 2009 
o Magnetometers March 2010 
o ReactIOn Wheels March 2010 
o Torque COlIs June 2010 
o Sun Sensors October 2010 
• Power 
o Integrated PPU May 2010 
o MPPT July 2010 
o On-board Charger May 2010 
o PDU Apnl2010 
o FlatSat August 2009 
o Solar Power Apnl 2010 
• Structures 
o VIbratIOn March 2009, February 2010, October 2010 
o Thermal-Vacuum March 2010, October 2010 
• SCIence 
o Camera AVIOnICS May 2010 
o Camera FunctIOnal September 2010 
o Camera Thermal-Vacuum ApnlOl0 
o Camera VIbratIOn Apnl2010 
• PropulSIOn 
o DCFT EffiCIency Apnl 2010 
o Feed System June 2010 
o Integrated PPU May 2010 
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The key tests are as descnbed In folloWIng sectIOns 
5 1 2 SOLAR ARRAY TESTING 
Due to the hIgh power reqUIrements of CASTOR and the fact that students are assemblIng the 
solar arrays, It IS cntIcal to perform extensIve testIng of the solar arrays The current 
configuratIon next needs to be tested to see If It gIves enough power to run each team's 
eqUIpment If the voltage, current, and resultIng power provIded encompasses the power needs, 
then the solar panel setup IS properly deSIgned 
ThIS InItIal test wIll venfy that the solar cells provIde the correct voltage, currents, and power 
that are eqUIvalent WIth the documentatIOn The lIght source used should IllumInate the entIre 
solar panel SInce the CASTOR deSIgn Involves two solar panels at 45° to the sun, It IS also 
necessary to test the effects of haVIng the lIght fallIng on the solar cells at dIfferent angles other 
than straIght overhead The lIght source used should IllumInate the entIre solar panel FInally, It 
IS necessary to ensure that the amount of power that each subsystem expects IS correctly 
supplIed The lIght source used should IllumInate the entIre solar panel As thIS test Involves the 
complete setup, a lIght source SImIlar to a spotlIght IS recommended 
513 FLATSAT TESTING 
Furthermore, It IS necessary to perform a Flatsat of the satellIte, whIch ensures that all 
components In the satellIte are able to commulllcate WIth each other ThIS Involves 
demonstratIOn of the ground statIOn's abIlIty to transmIt commands and the satellIte's abIlIty to 
receIve commands and execute as expected CASTOR has chosen to splIt the Flatsat testIng up 
Into a senes of tests that can be performed In sequence as dIfferent parts of the system are ready 
for testIng ThIS helps to ensure that the program remaInS on schedule and mIlllmIzes cntIcal 
paths These tests range from Flatsat I, whIch demonstrates baSIC ground statIOn capabIlItIes to 
Flatsat VI, WhICh demonstrates the aVIOlllCS system's capabIlIty to WIthstand the radIatIOn 
enVIronment of space 
5 2 COTS VERIFICATION 
Due to InCOnsIstencIes In COTS products matchIng preCIsely WIth theIr documentatIOn, testIng of 
COTS components IS reqUIred to ensure relIabIlIty as well as proper IntegratIOn WIth the overall 
system One example of venficatIOn of COTS components IS testIng of the commUlllcatIOn 
antennas SInce the 8 and 11 dBI antennas responsIble for commUlllcatIOns WIth the ground 
statIOn are COTS, anechOIc chamber testIng was performed to ensure that first, the antenna met 
the specIficatIOns, and second, that modIficatIOns to the antenna would not be detnmental to the 
system TestIng the antenna by Itself, and then as a system WIth the satellIte would lead to 
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increased TRL. Testing was performed at MIT Lincoln Laboratory (a professional facility 
located about half an hour from MIT). A comparison between actual performance and the 
specifications is shown below. 
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FIGURE 16: ANTENNA TEST RESULTS 
Hori~ntal 
FIGURE 17: ANTENNA SPECIFICATIONS SHEET 
From the graph of the radiation pattern, it is apparent that the quality of the antenna does not 
quite meet the specifications, but it was concluded to be sufficiently high to meet subsystem 
communication requirements. 
6 ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES 
Because of limitations in the CASTOR budget and the significant expense of flight model 
components, it is important to confine purchases and ensure that savings are found wherever 
possible. Team members manufacture most components on our satellite, saving the team a 
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significant amount of money. We are also able to generate several donations from companies 
who wish to sponsor our satellite. However, being participants in a competition, we must 
account for the possibility that our design might not be selected for flight. Because of this there 
are some components that may be imprudent to purchase at this phase in our design. 
Massachusetts Space Grant also helps support undergraduate students for their research 
contributions to the project, as well as unique testing projects run related to CASTOR organized 
by students. 
The current design calls for the use of three reaction wheels and four sun sensors. Due to the 
extremely high cost of these components, we have decided to rent engineering models from the 
manufacturers. These components have the same interfaces, mass, and functionality as the flight 
model version but are not as precise or expensive. Because we have decided to do this we are 
operating within our budget and able to demonstrate the functionality of our satellite. 
Ordered components are largely delivered in the span of a couple of days . There are very few 
long-lead items that we need to account for, but those that need to be purchased have been done 
so early in the design, and those components that are not in our possession are not limiting 
factors as we can continue design with a mock up until the component arrives. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The CASTOR mISSIOn is a complex project requiring the deep involvement of systems 
engineering concepts in its conception and development. Through careful systems planning, 
analysis and implementation, CASTOR continues to move forward as a project with the aim of 
improving efficiency of electric propulsion systems. High-performance propulsion systems have 
application to missions beyond GEO, allowing more efficient access to LaGrange Points, the 
Moon and beyond. With its strong mission relevance to the future of space exploration, 
CASTOR shall continue to progress towards the project requirements and objectives. After 
accomplishing post-CDR feedback, the CASTOR team will begin fabricating the satellite 
components for its prototype qualification review (PQR) in August of 2010. Finally, the 
complete satellite will be built for flight competition review (FCR) in January of 2011 , and 
hopefully a launch soon after. 
Finally, CASTOR's importance lies not only in its technical demonstration, but also in its 
application of making small spacecraft design a reality for not just NASA and the military, or 
even commercial industry, but also university students. Providing students with the opportunity 
to learn how to design, implement and operate space systems while thinking with a systems-
perspective greatly contributes to their education as engineers, and shall serve them in their 
future careers. 
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MC.I 
M. I 
M.2 
M.3 
S1.1 .1 
SI.1.1. 
I 
SI.1.1. 
2 
SI.I.1. 
3 
M ission R equirements 
Measure the on-orbit performance, efficiency, 
and degradation of the DeFT during orbital 
maneuvers 
Operate the DeFT on orbit for 1500 hours 
CASTOR Propulsion 
The propulsion system will be the DCFT 
DCFT must operate at a minimum of 40 to a 
nominal 100 Watts of power supplied to the 
PPU 
DCFT components must be operable for full 
mission lifetime 
DCFT will undergo cathode conditioning 
prior to operating 
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9.2 RVM 
S 1.1.1 
Sl.1.1 
S l.l.l 
Justification 
Validates the performance and 
application of the DCFT 
Proves the DCFT lifetime is 
for as long as needed to measure 
DCFT degradation 
XFS is incorporated into the 
system 
As per the Mission requirement 
The lowest power DCFT will 
fire is 40 Watts [minimum 
success mission]. At 165 Watts, 
DCFT is comparable to other 
of similar 
The ceramic cone and other 
DCFT components must survive 
1500 hours of operating 
To clean the engine of debris 
and contamination 
CASTOR 
Design 
Document 
CASTOR 
Design 
Test! Analysis 
Number 
Design 
Requirement 
Integrated PPU 
test 
Simulation 
Con-ops 
Page 55 
Document 
When not operating, DCFT must CASTOR S1.1.1. DCFT must remain in a heating or thrusting S 1.1.1 be in heating mode. Ifpower is Design Con-ops 4 mode after cathode conditioning not available for heating, the 
DCFT wi ll be tumed off entirely Document 
The propulsion system will use the XFS as CASTOR Design S1.1.2 As per the Mission requirement Design part of its propulsion system. Document Requirement 
Mass flow to DCFT allows 
S1.1.2. The XFS which must be able to regulate and 
control of electron flow and CASTOR Feed System S 1.1.2 ionization efficiency. Mass flow Design I vary mass flow to DCFT 
to cathode controls current flow, Document Test 
power draw. 
The plumbing system on the propulsion CASTOR S 1.1.2. system must have a minimum of three S 1.1.2 To ensure that the gas does not Design Design 2 electrically controlled mechanical gas flow vent from the plumbing system Requirement 
inhibits Document 
SI.I.2. The plumbing system will maintain the For DCFT to function at its BHC-ISOO DCFT efficiency S 1. 1.2 highest efficiency, it must Operation 3 pressure below 4000 (TBR) psi . 
maintain a low pressure Manual Test 
S 1.1.2. The fuel in the propulsion system must have a For DCFT to function at its BHC-ISOO S 1.1.2 highest efficiency, it must be fed Operation Xe spec sheet 4 purity of 99.999% pure and uncontaminated Xenon Manual 
~ R~"'~,"" roc d_'",'oo CASTOR The propulsion system must output current, S 1.1.3 
voltage, and mass flow data to avionics of performance and efficiency of Design FlatSat V DCFT Document 
CASTOR Imaging 
The imaging system must be able to take still • E,id"" or,oo'~"oo ,m b, CASTOR 
S 1.2.1 pictures of the DCFT plume to determine if seen in the exhaust plume within Design camera 
ionization is occurring a few inches of the DCFT nozzle Document functionality 
S 1.2.1. The imaging system shall be able to take An ionized exhaust plume is CASTOR propulsion 
I color pictures S1.2.1 blue/purp le, while a non ionized Design imaging test plume is red Document 
S 1.2.1. The imaging system shall have a spectral The camera must be able to CASTOR propulsion S1.2.1 Design 2 resolution of200 om distinguish between red and blue Document imaging test 
S 1.2.1. The imaging system shall use a minimum The camera must be ab le to pick CASTOR Initial camera 
3 resolution of320x240 pixels to ensure that S 1.2.1 out the plume from other objects Design testing 
there is enough detail for spectral analysis. in the frame of view Document 
The imaging system camera must be mounted Camera must be secured enough CASTOR S1.2.1. to the structure and pointed towards the S1.2.1 and directed correctly to analyze Design Engineering 4 DCFT nozzle to analyze plume shape and plume Document Model 
color 
The thruster monitoring camera shall have a A field of view in this range will CASTOR S 1.2.1. field of view between SO° and 70° S1.2.1 allow camera images to capture Design Camera Spec S (diagonally). the cathode, the anode, and a Document Sheet 
significant portion of the plume. 
S 1.2.1. The thruster monitoring camera shall be The camera must be working in CASTOR Balloon SHOT S1.2.1 Design 7 sufficiently protected and kept within spec order to collect data Document (II) 
S 1.2.1. The thruster monitoring camera must operate S 1.2.1. C328R-7640 camera CASTOR camera avionics Design 7.1 between 3.0 V and 3.6 V, and at 60 rnA 7 specifications Document testing 
MIT CASTOR NASA ESMD Paper Page 56 
S 1.2.1. The thruster monitoring camera must operate S1.2.1. C328R-7640 camera CASTOR Thermal Vacuum Design 7.2 between -20°C and 60°C 7 specifications Document Test 
The camera must provide 
continuous monitoring of the 
thruster and thruster plume to 
S 1.2.1. The thruster monitoring camera shall be S1.2.1. obtain a complete performance CASTOR Aluminum 
7.3 sufficiently shielded to survive and operate 7 data set. The high radiation Design Degradation Test for 6 months environment around the thruster Document 
will tend to degrade the camera 
and its electronics, so it must be 
nrn'Pr,,,ri 
The imaging system must be able to transmit Imaging data must be stored so CASTOR FlatSat If Camera S1.2.2 and store image data in avionics system it can be transmitted to ground Design Avionics 
memory for study Document 
SI.2.2. Imaging must be able to interface with the Imaging data must be analyzed CASTOR FlatSat If Camera 
I avionics and communications subsystems to S1.2.2 on ground Design Avionics 
transmit stored image data to ground station Document 
Imaging system must be able to capture Imaging data must be collected CASTOR FlatSat If Camera S1.2.3 images at least once per orbit and store regularly to monitor DCFT Design Avionics images for up to two weeks outflow Document 
Image data may only be stored CASTOR SI.2.3. Imaging must be able to send image data to S1.2.3 for two weeks, images older than Design FlatSat If Camera I ground station at least every two weeks two weeks may not be stored Document Avionics 
and transferred. 
CASTOR Power (EPS) 
EPS must generate, store, regulate, and The spacecraft (to include the CASTOR S1.3.1 distribute power to the spacecraft DCFT) require power to Design power FlatSat I 
complete the mission Document 
EPS must provide 85W to DCFT, specifically We are not constantly operating CASTOR SI.3 .1. 16W to the Cathode keeper and 59W to the S 1.1.1 the anode. The Cathode Keeper Design power FlatSat I I will always be on. This requires 
anode. that EPS provide 16W. Document 
S 1.3 .1. EPS must provide sufficient power to run The satellite must be able to CASTOR 
2 power generation, communications, and SI.3 .1 operate indefinitely to account Design power FlatSat I 
status of health . .~ for any failures Document 
SI.3.1. EPS must provide 100 W to the PPU while The DCFT requires power to the CASTOR SI.3.1 anode and cathode during Design power FlatSat I 3 operating and 40 W while heating different operational states Document 
SI.3.1. EPS must be able to generate 113.7W in a SI.3.I , All critical ~~stems require SI.3.1. batteries require Power Budget solar panel test 4 fully operational state. 2 27.79W to char)!;e 
Total battery capacity is a 
SI.3 .1. Batteries shall have a capacity of 40Wh to consumable, and batteries must CASTOR 
5 support spacecraft operations over mission SI.3 .1 be able to store enough energy to Design power FlatSat I lifetime run heater and supporting Document 
when in eclipse 
S 1.3. 1. EPS shall regulate bus voltage and distribute Different components require CASTOR 
6 power to operate subsystem components SI.3 .1 different input voltages, so the Design power FlatSat I power must be regulated Document 
EPS shall provide state data to determine EPS data is necessary for CASTOR 
S1.3 .2 DCFT state, track DCFT power efficiency, monitoring system state and Design power/launch downlinking information for FlatSat 
and to monitor bus health 
: analysis Document 
S1.3.3 EPS shall be in a safe launch state and shall Mitigate interference with UNP User's power/ launch power on the flight processor after separation launch vehicle Guide FlatSat 
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SI.3.3. To provide a safe interface with UNPUser's power/ launch EPS shall be powered off during launch SI.3.3 the launch vehicle, the satellite I 
will be powered down at launch Guide FlatSat 
S1.3.3. EPS shall provide power to the bus after CASTOR power/ launch S1.3.3 Design 2 detaching from Lightband Document FlatSat 
SI.3.3 . A fully charged battery at launch UNPUser's power/ launch The battery shall be launched discharged S1.3.3 is a safety concern for the launch 3 
vehicle and range Guide FlatSat 
CASTOR Structures 
S1.4.1 The structure must support interfaces with all Design 
subsystems Requirement 
S 1.4.1. The structure must provide a means of Design 
attachment for all components that does not I 
on friction Requirement 
SI.4.1. CASTOR components must comply with Master Materials 
2 outgassing, corrosion resistance, and SI.4.1 List flammability resistance requirements 
S1.4.2 The satellite structure must survive the launch Vibration Test 
environment and interface with the LV 
SI.4.2. The satellite shall have a natural frequency of Vibration Test I at least 100 Hz in each direction 
SI.4.2. The satellite shall withstand a load of20 g's SI.4.2 Vibration Test 2 in each direction 
SI.4.2. The CG for the satellite shall be less than 0.5 
3 cm from the Lightband centerline, including SI.4.2 Vibration Test 
manufacturing tolerances 
SI.4.2. The CG must lie less than 40 cm above the S1.4.2 ensure the satellite behaves Vibration Test 4 SIP (+Z axis) predictably during separation 
The satellite shall be mounted to the LV The Lightband is the separation SI.4.2. interface via a PSC Motorized Lightband SI.4.2 mechanism and LV interface Vibration Test 5 identified for use for UNP-6 and 
system CASTOR 
The structure shall support deployable solar Body-mounted solar panels do S 1.4.3 panels not provide the power required FlatSat IV EPS 
The satellite structure at launch shall fit into a Design S1.4.4 50 cm x 50 cm x 60 cm volume, not MC.! UNP User's Guide requirement 
interface Requirement 
S 1.4.5 The mass of the satellite shall not exceed 50 MC. I UNP User's Guide requirement CASTOR CASTOR Mass kg Mass Budget Budget 
The factor of safety for analysis must be CASTOR S1.4.6 MC.I UNP User's Guide requirement Design Vibration Test 
above 2 for yield and 2.6 for ultimate Document 
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CASTOR T hermal 
Components must keep in 
The satellite must have adequate thermal certain temperature ranges so CASTOR 
S1.5.1 protection during all mission phases to keep that their functionality or Design Thermal 
all components within operational structural integrity is not Document Model/T-Vac 
temperature ranges compromised and they can carry 
our their intended task 
SI.5.1. CASTOR Thermal 
I SI.5.1 This gives some leeway Design ModellT-Vac Document 
SJ.5 .1. CASTOR Thermal 
1.1 S1.5.1 NiCd Spec Sheet Design ModellT-Vac Document 
S J.5 .1. CASTOR Thermal 
1.2 SI.5 .1 MPPT Spec Sheet Design ModellT-Vac Document 
SI.5.1. CASTOR Thermal 
1.3 SI.5 .1 PPU Spec Sheet ModellT-Vac 
SI.5.1. SI.5.1 PDU Spec Sheet Thermal 1.4 ModellT-Vac 
SI.5.1. SI.5 .1 MEMS IMU Spec Sheet Design Thermal 1.5 Document ModellT-Vac 
S 1.5.1. CASTOR Thermal 
1.6 S1.5 .1 Reaction Wheel Spec Sheet Design ModellT-Vac 
SI.5 .1. CASTOR Thermal 
1.7 S1.5.1 GPS Spec Sheet Design ModellT-Vac Document 
SI.5 .1. CASTOR Thermal 
1.8 SI.5.1 Camera Spec Sheet ModellT-Vac 
SI.5.1. SI.5.1 Testing see document Thermal 1.9 ModellT-Vac 
S 1.5.1. Xenon gas shall remain above (23) ·C during Sl.5.1 Nasa requirement Design Thermal 1.10 DCFr operations Document ModellT-Vac 
SI.5 .1. CASTOR Master Materials 
2 S 1.5.1 Design List Document 
SI.5 .1. supplied to AFRL and at a minimum shall CASTOR Thermal 
3.1 consist of a simplified model that includes MC. I UNP User's Guide Design ModellT-Vac 
nodes for each of the temperature cri tical Document 
A list of all payload external surface CASTOR S l.5 .1. properties, including area (size), MC.I UNP User's Guide Design Master Materials 3.4 material/process, absorptivity, and emissivity, Document List 
shall be 
To monitor component's 
The satellite' s components shall be monitored temperature in order to determine if reorientation is CASTOR 
S 1.5 .2 by thermal sensors, which shall interface with necessary to keep components Design FlatSat IT 
the avionics system and be compatible with 
within specified temperature Document 
the available power 
ranges as well as monitor the 
status of the DCFr 
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The satellite shall have 20 number of thermal 
S1.5 .2. sensors consisting of 6 K-type thermocouples CASTOR Design 
1 and 14 LMl9 analog sensors in order to See Design Doc. Design Requirement 
accurately monitor the temperature of Document 
SI.5.2. CASTOR 
1.3 Design FlatSat II Document 
ensure that the temps CASTOR S 1.5.2. All Thermal Hardware on the satellite shall are in the specified ranges. This Design FlatSat II 1.4 take readings every 120 seconds. will be sent down to the ground Document 
station. 
SI.5.2. Thermal readings shall be provided to the CASTOR 
2 ground station from the satellite every 90 needed for analysis purposes Design FlatSat I 
minutes. Document 
CASTORADCS 
firing angle with respect to the 
ADCS shall provide pointing knowledge to body and inertial space must be ADCS known to account for loss of distinguish DCFT efficiency changes from delta-V efficiency; there is less CASTOR SimulationlMagn 
S 1.6.1 pointing errors, to allow for attitude control, than 0.4% error for 5 degree of Design etometer Test! 
and to enable effective communications with Reaction Wheels 
the ground station. Objective: 1 degree, knowledge. Additionally, Document Test! FlatSat IIII 
Threshold: 5 degrees sensing must be finer than GPS Test 
control authority and 
S1.6.1. ADCS sensors shall provide position data to Sensing in control loop must be CASTOR fast enough in order to meet Design FlatSat III 1 processor. Objective: 1Hz, Threshold: 0.2Hz pointing requirements Document 
Control affects solar panel 
ADCS shall provide 3-axis attitude control output and operational CASTOR Torque Coils 
S1.6.2 authority to enable proper pointing of the predictability and safety, 25 Design Test! Reaction body, solar arrays, and engine. Objective: 5 degrees pointing represents less Document Wheels Test degree, Threshold: 25 degrees than a 10% loss in power 
or thrust direction 
The DCFT will not be operating 
in eclipse and the worst case 
tested using 
SI.6.2. orientation is 180 degrees. To CASTOR reaction wheel 
1 ADCS shall be able to slew 18 deglmin S1.6.2 ensure the thrust is in the proper Design models and air direction, the satellite must be Document bearing 
able to be pointed in the correct 
orientation within 10 minutes 
order to have proper control CASTOR Torque Coils SI.6.2. ADCS shall have sufficient components to S1.6.2 throughout the lifetime of Design Test! Reaction 2 store and manage angular momentum CASTOR, angular momentum Document Wheels Test 
must be theACS 
ADCS 
CASTOR SimulationlMagn SI.6.2. The ADCS subsystem shall apply net forces S1.6.2 Minimize disturbance to GNC Design etometer Test! 3 to the spacecraft under 10-3 N. and engine system Reaction Wheels Document Test! FlatSat IIII 
GPS Test 
SI.6.2. ADCS actuators shall follow a commanded Actuator must be commanded CASTOR 
4 torque from processor. Objective: 1Hz, S1.6.2 fast enough in order to meet Design FlatSatIll Threshold: 0.2Hz pointing requirements Document 
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,-
ADCS components will meet or CASTOR Vibration 
S 1.6.3 ADCS components must comply with SI.4.1. exceed mass and power Design TestlMaster 
material and structural requirements 2 minimum requirements. Physical 
interfaces will be verified. Document Material List 
S1.6.3. ADCS components must comply with S 1.4.1. Materials must not have CASTOR Master Materials 
I requirements for outgassing, corrosion 2 excessive outgassing Design List 
and " -'" resistance Document 
S 1.6.3. ADCS components must meet UNP vibration SI.4.1. ADCS components must not CASTOR 
2 requirements 2 cause or be damaged during Design Vibration Test launch Document 
In order to meet mission CASTOR SI .6.3. ADCS components must minimize power SI .6.2 requirements, ADCS power Design engineering 3 usage must be conserved and model testing 
minimized Document 
CASTORGNC 
GNC information is necessary 
CASTOR shall have on-orbit GNC for autonomous commanding of CASTOR 
S1.7.1 knowledge to manage DCFT operations and thrusting times and desired Design FlatSat TIIIGPS 
engine pointing vector, and Test! IMU test 
measure real-time position and velocity gives data on the change in the Document 
orbit 
S1.7 .1. GNC syste"! shall be able to have on-orbit CASTOR no.itio~in" knowledge within I Ian while S1.7.1 Accurate positioning knowledge Design GPS Test I ~perating DCFT Document 
S1.7.1. GNC system shall be able to have velocity Accurate velocity knowledge CASTOR 
2 knowledge within 10 mls while operating and sensing orbital changes Design IMU Test DCFT Document 
Satelli te must know when it is 
GNC system shall provide orbital state data over the ground station to CASTOR 
S.1.7.2 to the avionics system to manage ini tiate communications and the Design FlatSat TIl 
communications and determine the sun angle position of the sun is necessary Document 
for power >t;, 
CASTOR Avionics 
Avionics system shall provide the necessary 
__ S .. ,lli" req"i,~ _",,,, CASTOR S 1.8.1 Design FlatSat X data interfaces to support all subsystems controls Document 
S1.8.1. Avionics will continually monitor the Sensor data required for accurate CASTOR propulsion system to ensure that the thruster S1.8.1 Design FlatSat TI I does not on,;,;nnolv activate determination of satellite state. Document 
S1.8.1. Avionics will run the propulsion system's Engine firing control required to CASTOR S1.8 .1 Design FlatSat III 2 engine firing logic twice per orbit. keep stable orbit. Document 
Avionics will interface with the ADCS 
S 1.8.1. subsystem to execute a Kalman Filter using Attitude control necessary for CASTOR 
3 sensor data to accurately determine the S1.8.1 propulsion and imaging to Design FlatSat TV 
satellite state and implement a PD control law operate as required. Document 
for state at a "- of I Hz. 
Avionics will provide the computation Interface cruc ial for accurate CASTOR S 1.8.1. necessary for navigation control through the S1.8 .1 determination of satellite Design FlatSat TV 4 use of GPS data collection and an SGP4 
Prnnoaotnr at a "'- ofl Hz. position . Document 
The Avionics subsystem shall interface with Data must be down linked from CASTOR S 1.8.1. the communications subsystem to send and S1.8.1 the DCFT and it must be Design FlatSat I 5 receive data when communications possible for commands to be 
~onohilitipo are available. ~plinked to the satellite. Document 
S 1.8.1. In order for communications to occur the S1.8.1. It is critical to ensure that data is CASTOR 
5.1 Avionics system will packetize, send, and 5 not lost in the communications Design FlatSat I 
verify that all data is sent and received. channel Document 
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Avionics will provide the interface for power Avionics will provide the CASTOR S1.8.1. systems to monitor critical power levels and S1.8 .1 control logic to ensure that Design FlatSat lIT 6 execute fail safes if necessary at a frequency power is properly distributed Document 
S1.8.1. Avionics will interface with the imaging CASTOR 
7 device to facilitate the capture and storage of S1.8.1 Design FlatSat II images. Document 
S 1.8.1. Avionics will be capable of capturing and CASTOR 
7.1 storing at least I image per orbit without S1.8.1 Design FlatSat IT 
overriding the data for 2 weeks. Document 
Avionics system shall provide the computing CASTOR 
S1.8 .2 power and data storage capacity to process Design FlatSat x 
and store all necessary state data. Document 
SI.8.2. SI .8.2 Design FlatSat x 1 Document 
There will be enough flash memory available I GB of flash memory used for CASTOR SI.8.2. for storage of critical data and operational S1.8.2 storage oflarge data sets and Design FlatSat x 2 
code. images. Onboard memory used Document for transient storage of data. 
Avionics system shall be fault tolerant and Satellite will be flying in LEO CASTOR SI.8 .3 
able to recover from SEU failure. and be subject to radiation SEUtest 
SI.8.3. can 
I S 1.8.3 discrepancies caused by SEU Design SEU test failures. Document 
Through It is critical that the avionics CASTOR SI.8.3. avionics system shall be able to recover from S1.8.3 system be able to quickly Design SEU test 2 an SEU fault in under 1 minute from the time 
of detection. recover after a SEU. Document 
Avionics system shall retain programming Satellite must be able to power UNP User's S1.8.4 on after being powered off for Datasheet 
and state when unpowered 
storage and launch Guide 
Avionics system shall permit software Software needs to be replaced or CASTOR S1.8.5 updates for upgrading running software and 
changed to allow for upgrades Design avionics FlatSat 
recovering from SEU faults . Document 
CASTOR Software 
Software shall be capable of performing a Satellite hardware must be CASTOR 
S1.9.1 cold startup, self-test, and establish a comm activated after separation from Design avionics FlatSat 
link the launch vehicle Document 
Software is necessary for 
Software shall support communications, managing all system tasks, to CASTOR S1.9.2 include engine operations, Design FlatSat x 
operations, scheduling, and health monitoring 
attitude, data storage, and Document 
communications 
Adequate memory (both RAM 
S 1.9.2. Software will have access to enough memory and Mass Storage) will be CASTOR 
I to support all operations S1.9.2 provided to the avionics Design FlatSat x 
software to support all Document 
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The engine should be pointed CASTOR S 1.9.2. Software shall integrate ADCS/GNC data to before being fired and the Design ACS FlatSat 2 perform estimation and control satellite should know its location Document 
Software will implement a Kalman filter to CASTOR SI.9.2. perform estimation necessary and implement Design ACS FlatSat 2.1 a PD control law to establish control of the 
vehicle for ADCS. Document 
SI.9.2. Design ACS FlatSat 2.2 Document 
The engine must be controlled in CASTOR SI.9.2. Software shall interface with the DCFTIPPU software since it requires Design FlatSat II 3 complex timings and feedback Document for verification 
Communications support will include storing CASTOR SI.9.2. data, packetizing data, and ensuring the S1.9.2 Design FlatSat I 4 integrity of the data received by the ground Document 
station. 
commands 
Software shall execute the processes Maintaining health data for all CASTOR SI.9.2. necessary to collect sensor data to ensure the S1.9.2 subsystems is critical to ensuring Design FlatSat II 5 necessary information is available for all proper functionality of the Document 
satellite 
Software will use a RTOS to implement the The strict scheduling CASTOR SI.9.2. scheduling of all processes required by S1.9.2 requirements of the spacecraft Design software test 6 satellite subsystems to ensure accurate timing require the use of a RTOS for Document 
Software will implement continual To avoid errors due to SEUs, the CASTOR SI.9.2. Avionics software will 
7 checksums of available memory to monitor S 1.9.2 continually be looking out for Design SEU Test for SEU faults and other errors in operations. Document 
errors 
S1.9.3 Software should provide the ability to S 1.8.3 Software needs to be replaced in software test 
reprogram the flight computers the event of SEU or errors 
S.I.IO CASTOR Communications 
S. l.! O. The communications subsystem shall provide Ground station must be able to FlatSat II Antenna 
I the ability to transmit commands from the command and control the Testing ground station to the satellite. satellite 
Sl.!O.1 The communications subsystem shall be Minimum equipment necessary Design 
equipped with a dish and a modem at the Sl.! 0.1 to perform the functionality 
.1 ground station. required by l.! 0.1 Requirement 
Sl.lO.1 The communications subsystem shall provide Ground station must be able to FlatSat II 
.2 the ability for the satellite to receive Sl.lO.1 command and control the Antenna Testing 
commands from the ground station. satellite 
Sl.lO.1 The commurtications subsystem shall be Sl.!O.1 Minimum equipment necessary Design 
equipped with at least one antenna and one to perform the functionality 
.2.1 
modem on the satellite. .2 required by l.! 0.1.2 Requirement 
Ground station contact with 
The communications system shall be able to RETE only lasts for 8-12 CASTOR Sl.!O.2 minutes per pass and Design FlatSat I 
establish a robust and periodic link 
communications interruptions Document 
must be handled 
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The communications subsystem shall In order to request CASTOR S1.10.2 recognize correct packets from incorrect 
.1 packets and be able to request retransmission S1.10.2 retransmission and to avoid the Design FlatSat I 
if the execution of wrong commands Document 
CASTOR 
The link layer protocol, from the modem, Design 
S1.10.2 shall be able to recognize correct packets S1.10.2 Derived from 1.10.2.1 Document FlatSat I 
.1.1 from incorrect packets and be able to request .1 FlatSatl 
retransmission if the packet is faulty. Result 
Document 
The upper 
S1.10.2 on the satellite and ground station, shall be SI.1 0.2 CASTOR 
.1.2 able to recognize correct packets from .1 Derived from 1.1 0.2.1 Design FlatSat I incorrect packets and be able to request Document 
CASTOR 
The satellite shall be able to receive a set-up The ground station will start the Design SI.1 0.2 ACK from the ground station and start a SI.1 0.2 communication session, but the Document, FlatSat I 
.2 satellite has to be able to react FlatSat I 
communications link 
and to start transmitting data Result 
Document 
SI.1 o.z The modem shall be able to wake up from mode(for power reasons) until CASTOR 
.2.1 sleeping mode when commanded to so as to S1.10.2 the system is ready to Design FlatSat I 
start a communications link. 
communicate Document 
The communication sessions 
S1.10.2 The communications subsystem shall be able will be limited up to a maximum CASTOR 
. 3 to store packets to prevent overflow . SI.1 0.2 of 30 minutes per day, hence Design FlatSat I packets need to be stored before Document 
the transmission 
S1.10.2 The communications protocol shall be able to S1.1 0.2 CASTOR 
.3.1 set up packet queues on the satellite and the .3 Derived from 1.10.2.3 Design FlatSat I ground station. Document 
Especially for telemetry and 
The communications subsystem shall be able commands, both ground station CASTOR S 1.1 0.2 to identify missing packets and out of order S 1.1 0.2 and satellite need to recognize if Design FlatSat I 
.4 packets. some piece of the transmission Document have been lost, in order to ask 
for retransmission 
S1.1 o.z The communications protocol shall be able to S1.10.2 CASTOR 
.4.1 identify missing packets and out of order .4 Derived from 1.10.2.4 Design FlatSat I packets . Document 
Series of complete pictures 
The communications subsystem shall be able necessary for measurement of 
to support a bandwidth and data rate engine degradation. Engine CASTOR Design SI.1 0.3 operation verification at the Design 
necessary to transmit all telemetry (67bps) ground station requires sufficient Document Requirement 
and pictures (2 per orbit 640"480 pixels). 
system health data as well as 
detecting problems 
The communications subsystem shall be fully To counteract loss of coverage CASTOR Design S 1.1 0.4 or single element failure which Design 
redundant 
can cause loss of mission Document Requirement 
S1.1 0.4 The communications subsystem shall be Derived from previous CASTOR Design SI.1 0.4 Design 
.1 equipped with 2 antennas requirement Document Requirement 
SI.I 0.4 The communications subsystem shall be Derived from previous CASTOR Design SI.I0,4 Design 
.2 equipped with 2 modems requirement Document Requirement 
CASTOR 
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S2.1.1 Ground shall provide the capability to 
communicate with the satellite 
Ground should provide the functionality to S2.l.2 
upload new programs to the satellite 
Ground should implement closed loop ACK S2.1.3 
on commands 
Ground shall have the ability to identify S2.l.4 
errors in pictures and request retransmit 
Ground must be manned by qualified staff S2.l.5 
while in communications with CASTOR 
S2.1.6 Ground must be able to simulate the satellite 
and predict future state 
Ground Support 
S2.2.1 MC. I 
S2.2.6 MC. I 
S2.2.7 MC.I 
S2.2.8 MC.I 
S2.2.9 MC. I 
S2.2.IO MC. I 
S2.2.11 MC.I 
S2.2.12 MC.I 
S2.2.13 MC. I 
S2.2.14 MC.I 
S2.2.15 MC. I 
S2.2.2 CASTOR shall have a transportation case MC.I 
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Ground-based command 
necessary to schedule engine 
firing and problem recovery 
Comparing operational data to 
simulation permits verification 
of the validity of our models 
To control the satellite, ground 
station must establish 
Images of engine firing must be 
usable for engine degradation 
analysis 
An operator must be on hand to 
interpret satellite data, issue 
commands, and debug problems 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
UNP User's Guide 
Con-Ops 
Document& 
Castor Design 
Document 
Con-Ops 
Document 
CASTOR 
Design 
Document 
CASTOR 
Design 
Document 
CASTOR 
Design 
Document 
CASTOR 
Design 
Document 
CASTOR 
Design 
Document 
CASTOR 
Design 
Document 
FlatSat x 
FlatSat I 
FlatSat II 
Antenna Testing 
FlatSat I 
FlatSat I 
FlatSat I 
License 
FlatSat x 
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S2.2.2. The transportation case must be portable MC.I UNP User's Guide I 
S2.2.3 CASTOR shall have a lifting harness MC.I UNP User's Guide 
Castor shall have a lifting harnesses designed 
S2.2.3 . to lift the nanosatellite from a single point 
I above its center of gravity, in every MC.I UNP User's Guide 
orientation except upside down (+-X, +-Y, 
+Z) 
Castor shall have lifting equipment that is 
S2.2.3. designed such that it will not contact the MC.! UNP User's Guide 2 Lightband during integration and ground 
handling operations 
S2.2.3. Lifting Harness shall be shipped in the MC.I UNP User's Guide 3 shipping container 
S2.2.3. Lifting Harness shall engage the 4 trusses of MC.1 UNP User's Guide 4 the satellite. 
Castor shall have Tabletop MGSE stands that 
S2.2.4 are able to support the nanosatellite with, MC. I UNP User's Guide 
without, and with only half of the Lightband 
CASTOR's MGSE shall be designed using a 
S2.2.5 factor of safety of5.0 for ultimate failure, and MC. I UNP User's Guide 
be proof loaded to twice the design load 
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9.3 COST PROJECTION THROUGH SUMMER 2010 
ESTIMATED 
Sub-team ITEM DESCRIPTION COST 
ADCS Torque Coil $225.00 
ADCS Sun Sensor $90.00 
ADCS Microprocessor $105.00 
Avionics Camera x2 $500.00 
Avionics DSC Board $150.00 
Comm Antennas $200.00 
Power Lambdas Converters $400.00 
Power PCB for new PXU $132.00 
Power Other Inverter expenses $150.00 
Power Solar Cell Test Boards $660.00 
Power Solar Panel Electrical Construction Items $100.00 
Power NiCd Battery Charging Chips and Test Boards $170.00 
Power MPPT components/new one $450.00 
Power Test Batteries (possibly different types) $500.00 
Power Miscilaneous Parts and Components $450.00 
Propulsion Flow Controllers (X2) $1,400.00 
Software GPS Simulator (Terrestrial) $100.00 
Software Miscellaneous Electronics for Ground Station (heavy margin) $500.00 
Structures SEM Aluminum $850.00 
Structures SEM Fasteners $400.00 
Structures Machining- Tank Clamps (Material, $750.00 
Thermal Thermal Sensors $100.00 
Thermal Thermocouples $300.00 
Thermal Thermalcouple control board $100.00 
Thermal Test Materials $200.00 
Thermal Surface Finishes $200.00 
Thermal Software $300.00 
Integrated 
Systems Lincoln Laboratory Test Campaign $4,500.00 
TOTAL: $13,982.00 
Additional: Clean Room and Electronics Room Tools $2,500.00 
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9.4 RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX 
MIT CASTOR NASA ESMD Paper Page 68 
Apn123,2010 
ADCS Category Component Failure Mode DeSCriptIOn DependencIes 
2-01 Hardware GPS GPS FaIlure GPS provides lllcorrect pOSItion Power (or converter) Fmlure 
data or no posItIon data 
2-02 Hardware Sun Sensor Sun Sensor Smgle One Sun Sensor provides Power (or converter) Fmlure 
FaIlure lllcorrect sun posItion or no sun 
pOSitIOn 
2-05 Hardware IMU IMU Rate Sensor Rate Sensor provides lllcorrect Power (or converter) Fmlure 
rate data or no rate data 
2-06 Hardware Magnetometer Magnetometer Magnetometer provides mcorrect Power (or converter) Fmlure 
magnetIc field lllformatIOn or no 
magnetic field lllformatIOn 
2-07 Operational Reactton Wheel ReactIon Wheel Smgle One ReactIon Wheel fmls to Power (or converter) Fmlure 
FaIlure operate properly 
2-10 Hardware Torque Coil Torque COIl Smgle One Torque COlI does not Power (or converter) Fmlure 
FaIlure prOVide expected magnettc 
dipole, or provides no magnetic 
dipole 
2-13 Hardware W mng Harness ADCS WIrIng Harness Incorrect wmng that leads to any avlOUlCS malfunctIOn 
of the Issues mentIOned above 
2-14 Hardware Sun Sensor Sun sensor output Outputs only one or two angle lllterface malfunctIOn 
fmlure lllstead of three 
---
2-15 Software Magnetometer Magnetometer Magnetometer readmgs do not control law aVIOlllCS 
MlscahbratlOn match expected values from 
IGRF Model 
2-16 Software Torque COIl Torque COIl Polanty Torque cOils provide opposite control law, aVIOlllCS 
InversIOn torque than expected 
2-17 Software Software General Software Errors Software errors that lead to any control law, aVIOlllCS 
of the Issues mentIOned above 
ContmuatIOn of ADCS RISks 
ADCS MitigatIOn Diagnostic Repair Backup TRL Seventy LikelIhood Risk Date Updated 
Level By 
2-01 Satelhte orbItal thorough None TLR 2 2 low 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
posItIon can be testmg DeLatte 
found by 
propagatmg 
TLEs 
2-02 Thorough thorough none other sun 8 2 2 low 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
testmg and testmg sensors DeLatte 
evaluatlOn of 
sun sensor 
functIonahty and 
mterface desIgn 
2-05 FunctIonahty no readmgs none GPS, sun 2 2 low 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
testmg and sensors DeLatte 
mterface testmg 
IMU IS not 
necessary for 
measunng 
attitude but It 
provIdes more 
assurance ThIS 
IS a redundant 
system 
2-06 FunctlOnahty no readmgs none sun 4 2 MED 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
testmg mterface sensors DeLatte 
testmg and IMU GPS 
cahbratlOn 
agamst a known 
magnetic field 
--_._-
-_.- - -----
2-07 FunctionalIty no readmgs none torque cOils 3 2 MED 4/912010 Dallielle 
testmg and can control DeLatte 
mterface testmg attitude but 
If a smgle wheel It's very 
falls, reqUired slow 
slew maneuvers 
can be 
completed over 
longer penod of 
time usmg the 
torque COlIs 
2-10 Thorough no readmgs none rely on 3 3 MED 4/9/2010 Dallielle 
testmg and other two DeLatte 
evaluatIOn of 
torque COlI 
functIOnalIty and 
mterface design 
If one torque 
coil fails the 
other two COlIs 
will be able to 
provide enough 
torque to 
desaturate the 
reactIOn wheels 
m an extended 
penod of time 
2-13 IndiVidual and thorough none aVlOlliCS 4 2 MED 4/912010 Dallielle 
mtegrated testmg DeLatte 
wmng tests to 
ensure expected 
functIOnalIty 
AVIOlliCS m 
charge of thIs 
2-14 1400 field of thorough software aVailable 2 2 low 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
VIew havlllg testlllg patch, angles DeLatte 
more helps but control suffiCIent 
IS not necessary algonthm 
2-15 Careful error recahbrated software 2 2 low 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
cahbratIOn of exception III orbIt patch DeLatte 
magnetometer recahbrated 
If cahbratIon IS III orbIt 
off can be 
recahbrated on 
orbIt 
2-16 DIpole testlllg error software software 2 2 low 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
before and after exception patch patch DeLatte 
Integration If 
polanty IS 
reversed can be 
corrected on 
orbIt 
2-17 Thorough error software software 3 3 MED 4/9/2010 Dalllelle 
software testlllg exceptIOn patch patch DeLatte 
before and after 
IlltegratlOn If 
problems anse 
III software, new 
verSIOns can be 
uploaded on 
orbIt 
---
~-
AVIODlCS Category Component Failure Mode Description Dependencies 
3-01 OperatIOnal/Design PIC PIC Failure PIC hardware fatlure 
• 3-02 Operational PIC SEU PIC SEU IonslRadlatIOn causes a transistor I 
to flip I 
3-03 Design PIC Inter PIC PIC commulllcatIons failure Software/Hardware 
CommUlllcatIOns CommUlllcatIOns Implementation error 
3-04 Design PIC Deadlock RTOS Software Multiple threads lock waltlllg for ThreadX software 
Deadlock each other s signals ImplementatIOn error 
3-05 OperatIOnal Wires Wire separatIOn Wire connectIons fail dunng W mng harnesses breaks 
operatIOn Solder connections fall 
3-06 OperatIOnal Memory Memory corruptIOn Data III memory becomes Data stored ill memory 
corrupted becomes unrehable 
3-07 Design Memory Memory overflow Data bUIldup over tIme without Data not correctly 
deletIon offloaded when 
appropnate 
3-08 OperatIOnal PIC InvalId command Incorrect/unusable commands are Incorrect software 
sent to aVIOllICS hardware ImplementatIOn 
3-09 OperatIOnal A VlOlllCS Board Environmental Damage ThennallVlbratIOnalletc damage HeatIVlbratIOn reach 
to aVIOllICS eqUIpment beyond controllable levels 
------------- -------
AVlOlllCS MItigation DIagnostic RepaIr Backup TRL Seventy LIkelIhood RIsk Date Updated 
Level By 
3-01 PIC fails to hardware Redundant 9 4 1 MED 3/15/2010 Steven 
respond reset PICs Gomez 
3-02 RadiatIOn hard Software Software 8 2 3 MED 3/15/2010 Steven 
components checksums reset Gomez 
chosen 
3-03 Robust mter Impossible backup 5 3 1 low 3/1512010 Steven 
commumcahon messages simple Gomez 
mterface received data bus 
redundant data 
channels 
3-04 Software Software Software Software 4 3 1 low 3/15/2010 Steven 
ImplementatIOn recogmze recovery reset Gomez 
designed to 
aVOId 
deadlocks 
3-05 Carem 4 1 MED 3/15/2010 Steven 
constructIOn Gomez 
and deSIgn of 
wire 
connectIOns 
3-06 Data DeletIOn of 1 3 low 3/1512010 Steven 
checksums unreliable Gomez 
data 
3-07 Ensure data IS Memory DeletIOn of 1 2 low 3/15/2010 Steven 
off loaded Full unnecessary Gomez 
correctly m data 
testmg 
3-08 Enforce stnct Hardware disregard 2 2 low 3/15/2010 Steven 
and clear API Interrupts further Gomez 
for commands 
commandmg from 
aVIOmcs offendmg 
hardware process 
3-09 pre budd Fadure to 4 1 MED 3115/2010 Steven 
testmg operate Gomez 
Comm Category Component Failure Mode DescnptIon DependencIes 
4-01 Design Antenna Smgle patch antenna on If the new patch antenna configuratIon fallure to deploy solar panels 
outsIde before deployment IS used before deployment there wIll 
only be one operatIonal antenna on the 
outsIde hence there WIll be no 
redundancy StIll can commUnIcate 
but less opportunIty to commUnIcate 
4-02 Hardware Antenna Antenna sWItchIng System IS set up to sWItch between 
faIls(look at prevIOus rIsk) antennas dependIng on whIch one 
provIdes a better commUnIcatIons lInk 
4-03 Hardware Interfacmg Interference between There could be Interference on the 
components commUnIcatIOns subsystem due to 
other components of the satellIte 
4-04 Hardware 11 dBi Antenna PlastIc antenna cover PlastIc cover of antenna mIght be Debns from another satelhte 
damaged damaged In space whIch could make component or space dust harsh 
the antenna InSIde perform sub launch enVironment 
optImally 
4-05 Hardware 8 dB 1 Antenna PlastIC antenna cover PlastIC cover of antenna mIght be Debns from another satelhte 
damaged damaged In space whIch could make component or space dust harsh 
the antenna InSIde perform sub launch enVironment 
optImally 
4-06 Hardware Wires ConnectIOns faIlure A connectIOn between antenna bad manufactunng 
modem or a PIC could faIl 
4-07 Hardware Modems Modem damaged Modem could be short cIrcUIted bad manufactunng, improper 
hardware mtegratlOn 
4-08lHardware Modems 
CommUnICatIOns contmued 
Comm MItigatIOn DIagnostic 
4-01 A possIble solutIOn IS to put a 
6dBI antenna on the outSIde 
however thIs would reqUire a 
SWItch between the 2 antennas 
A 3dB loss would be Incurred 
but the lInk budget would 
remaIn fine 
4-02 There IS no way to overcome more corrupt 
the faIlure of the SWItchIng packets, 
mechamsm however It IS safer hIgher 
than haVIng no SWItch and no 
occurrence of 
second antenna to solve the 
sIgnal loss prevIous fisk 
4-03 An EMI test wIll be performed 
to model and characteflze the 
Interference due to other 
components 
4-04 TestIng WIll be done at MIT 
LIncoln Lab on the antennas 
WIthout theIr plastIc covers to 
analyze theIr performance 
2 Modems damaged/faIl 
RepaIr Backup 
reset from 
ground 
Both Modems could be short 
cIrcUited 
two modem fmlures or 
combmatIOn of modem and 
WIre faIlures, 
TRL Seventy LIkelIhood RIsk Level Date [Updated 
~y 
3 3 3MED 3115/2010 !MIchael 
lMunoz 
3 3 3MED 3/30/2010 !MIchael 
!Munoz 
2 unknown 1 #VALUE' 3/30/2010 IMlchael 
!Munoz 
5 1 1 low 3/30/2010 IMlchael 
lMunoz 
4-05 TestIng will be done at MIT 5 1 I low 3/30/2010 Michael 
LIncoln Lab on the antennas Munoz 
without their plastic covers to 
analyze their performance 
4-06 Need to venfy that the different send none redundancy 3 3 I low 3/30/2010 Michael 
connectIOns between antennas commands Munoz 
modems and PIes are all 
strong and III a positIOn where 
the connectIOn cannot be lost 
4-07 Need to ensure that the board send none redundancy 3 3 2MED 3/30/2010 Michael 
where the modem will be commands Munoz 
placed on IS properly deSigned 
to aVOid such POSsibilities 
4-08 careful manufactunng & testIng no mcommg redundancy 3 4 2MED 3/30/2010 Michael 
data or Munoz 
response 
-------- ------
PropulsIOn Category Component FaIlure Mode Description DependencIes 
5-01 Hardware NASAPCS feed system failure xenon IS not fed at the rate none 
expected 
, 
5-02 Hardware NASAPCS feed adjustment failure cannot adjust the mass flow of none 
xenon to the thruster 
5-03 Hardware Cathode cathode pOIsoned Ifnot conditIOned properly conditionIng procedure not 
cathode matenal may be followed 
Irreparably damaged 
5-04 Hardware Cathode keeper/heater faIlure If the keeper or heater does not none If failure IS In 
maIntaIn the cathode at the subcomponent power 
appropnate temperature the system fallure could fall to 
conditIOnIng procedure must be dehver reqUlslte power to 
repeated or the thruster cannot hea ter/keeper be fired wIthout nskIng damage 
to the cathode 
5-05 Hardware Anode anode matenal after long pen ods of operatIOn none 
degradatIon anode matenal Will slowly 
degrade WIll eventually cease to 
operate 
5-06 Hardware Anode no power to anode wIth no power to anode no power system fallure 
potentIal across thruster and 
thus thruster Will not operate 
5-07 Hardware PlumbIng System electncal InhIbIt faIlure one or more electncalInhlblts power system fallure or 
faIls to open fallure ill the components 
themselves 
5-08 I Hardware Plumbmg System tank adapter faIlure 
p t d 
PropulsIOn MItigatIOn Seventy 
5-01 dunng XFS mtegratIon testmg wIll test to 3 
ensure feed system works as expected If 
system faIls on orbit thruster Will stIll 
operate as long as some mmlmum amount of 
Xenon IS delIvered to the thruster 
5-02 same as above 3 
5-03 CondltlOnmg procedure has been tested 5 
repeatedly and IS effective If cathode IS 
pOIsoned It IS unlIkely that It Will be able to 
operate at all leadmg to mISSIOn faIlure 
5-04 WIll test heater/keeper functIonalIty dunng 4 
thruster testmg, and try to mitigate pOSSIble 
power faIlures dunng mtegratlOn testmg wIth 
PPU 
5-05 normal part of DCFT operatIOn, WIll not 1 
affect mISSIOn dunng expected lIfetime 
faulty tank adapter could allow 
xenon to leak 
none 
LIkelihood RISk Level Date 
2 MED 3126/2020 
2 MED 3/26/2010 
1 MED 3/26/2010 
2 MED 3126/2010 
1 low 3/26/2010 
Updated By 
Keith Loebner 
Keith Loebner 
Keith Loebner 
KeIth Loebner 
KeIth Loebner 
5-06 wIth no power, thruster cannot operate, but 4 2 MED 3/2612010 KeIth Loebner 
can operate on reduced power by finng for 
less time 
5-07 WIll test mhibits dunng mtegratlOn testmg 4 1 MED 3/2612010 KeIth Loebner 
but on orbIt fmlure would end mlSSlOn If 
xenon flow to thruster cannot be mitiated 
5-08 WIll test component to try to guarantee space- 3 1 low 3/2612010 KeIth Loebner 
worthmess If It does leak It WIll shorten 
mlSSlOn hfetime but a small leak should still 
allow DeFT testmg on orbIt 
Power Category Component Failure Mode DescriptIOn DependencIes 
6-01 OperatlOnal Anode High voltage from anode couples mto 
system 
6-02 OperatlOnal Battenes BatterIes get memory Memory degrades m time, 
Less power storage 
capabilIty as tIme goes on 
6-03 OperatIonal PPU 200 Voltage Voltage converter falls All components that get short cirCUIted 
Converter power from converter can't 
get power, Anode faIlure 
6-04 OperatlOnal PPU 15 Voltage Voltage converter faIls heater for propulSive heater short cirCUIted 
Converter faIls 
6-05 OperatlOnal PDU 3 3 Voltage Voltage converter falls All components that get short cirCUIted 
Converter power from converter can't 
get power, aVlOlllC board, 
thermal sensors & thermal 
sensors 
6-06 OperatlOnal PDU 5 Voltage Voltage converter falls ADCS except torque COlIs short cirCUIted 
Converter (don't need converter, comm 
modem, lmear actuator for 
deployment 
6-07 OperatIonal Wires Wire becomes disconnected that component Will fall 
6-08 OperatlOnal Solar Panels Solar panels do not pomt at the sun reduced power mput ADCS failure or 
deployment 
fat lure 
6-09 Operational MPPT MPPT falls Tracks max power m solar 
panels, dlstnbutes to 
components whIle chargmg 
battenes 
6-10 OperatIOnal Battery Charglllg Charger falls to tum off battenes overcharge and stop 
Clrcmt workmg 
6-11 OperatIOnal Solar Panels Solar cell breaks, strand of cells becomes 
moperatlOnal 
Power contmued 
Power MItigatIOn DIagnostic Repair Backup TRL Seventy LikelIhood Risk Date Updated 
Level 
6-01 Isolated 4 1 MED 4/9/20lO Manal 
Habib 
6-02 testlllg, planned go 1 3 low 4/9/20lO Manal 
cycle change for through Habib 
Improve max-
performance, charge 
chosen battery for and deep 
high performance discharge 
dunng first year cycle 
6-03 testlllg careful component 4 4 2 MED 4/9/2010 Manal 
manufacturlllg fatled! no Habib 
power 
6-04 testlllg careful component 4 4 2 MED 4/912010 Manal 
manufacturlllg fatled! no Habib 
power 
--- -- --- ----
6-05 testlllg careful component 6 4 2 MED 4/9/2010 Manal 
manufactunng faIled! no HabIb 
power 
6-06 testlllg careful component 6 3 2 MED 4/9/2010 Manal 
manufactunng faIled! no HabIb 
power 
6-07 3 2 MED 4/9/2010 Manal 
HabIb 
6-08 3 2 MED 4/9/2010 Manal 
HabIb 
6-09 testlllg add no power to 4 2 MED 4/9/2010 Manal 
chargmg CircUIt to all HabIb 
Improve components 
performance 
6-10 careful no power to yes 4 2 MED 4/912010 Manal 
manufactunng and battenes HabIb 
testmg 
6-11 3 2 MED 4/9/2010 Manal 
HabIb 
Thermal Category Component Fatlure Mode DescnptlOn DependencIes 
7-01 OperatIOnal Thennal Sensor Sensor Failure no data connection breaks 
7-02 OperatIOnal Thennal Sensor Erroneous Sensor Data data from one sensor IS one of sensor failure, 
notlclbly different from software failure, power 
another failure calibration 
error 
7-03 OperatIOnal Component Component Outside Temperature Componenet exceeds none 
Range operatIOnal temp range 
Therma MItigation DIagnostic RepaIr Backup TR Sevent LIkebhoo RIsk Date Updated 
I L Y d Level 
7-01 careful no Replace/Re spares on 9 2 2 low 3/14/20lO George 
transport temperature pair Sensor hold other Sondecker 
data sensors on 
sate1hte 
7-02 careful erroneous Replace/Re spares on 9 3 2 MED 3/14/2010 George 
transport temperature pair Sensor hold other Sondecker 
data sensors on 
7-03 tum off/on temp sensor None none N/ 4 2 MED 3/14/20lO George 
high-power A Sondecker 
consumptIOn 
umts 
Structures Category Component FaIlure Mode DescnptIon Dependencies 
8-01 Transport Solar Panels Cracklllg Cover glass cracks dunng None 
transport/launch 
8-02 OperatIOnal Solar Panels Deployment FaIlure Lillear actuator faIl to operate or Manufactunng faIlure lillear 
the panels become Impillged on actuator faIlure, or power to 
deployment mechallism release mechallism failure 
8-03 Manufactunng Solar Panels Buckling Panel crushes near bolts None 
8-04 OperatIOnal Fastener Fastener breaks Bolt nut, lllsert failure dunng Structural faIlure 
launch could significantly 
damage the launch vehicle and 
payloads 
8-05 OperatIOnal Member member failure Excessive YIeldlllg or fracture Structural faIlure 
dunng launch could slglllficantly 
damage the launch vehicle and 
payloads 
8-06 OperatIOnal Pressure Vessel vessel ruptures Rupture or rapid depressunzatIOn Burst disk faIls to operate 
of the Xenon tank 
Structures contmued 
Structures MItigation Diagnostic Repair Backup TRL Seventy Likelihood Risk Level Date Updated By 
8-01 careful transport, plexlglass Visual replace spares on 9 2 4MED 3/1412010 George Sondecker 
standoffs lllspectIon cells hold 
- ~~ 
--
8-02 Build & Test Prototype low power try none 5 3 3MED 3/14/2010 George Sondecker 
release mechalllsms, sendmg 
outward-facmg panels power to 
modify duty cycle IS occurs actuators 
to mitigate adverse effects agam 
8-03 Use mserts m panels vIsible test replace none 6 3 1 low 3/14/2010 George Sondecker 
panel 
8-04 Installmg certified, NAS vlbe test replace spares on 9 4 2MED 3/14/2010 George Sondecker 
rated fasteners torqued to hardware hold 
NASA specified values on 
FhghtModel 
8-05 Conducted hand vlbe test replace remake 9 4 2MED 3/14/2010 George Sondecker 
calculatIOns, filllte element structure part 
modelmg and vibratIOnal 
tests to ensure structure 
meets g loadmg and VI be 
reqUIrements Certified 
alummum stock Will be 
used on the fhght model 
8-06 Tank Will be loaded below thruster replace none 9 3 2MED 3114/2010 George Sondecker 
ItS max rated pressure does not tank 
Burst disks on tank prevent operate 
catastrophic fmlure 
ScJ/Pay Category Component FaIlure Mode DescnptIon DependencIes 
9-01 OperatIOnal C328 Camera Lens Lens DegradatIOn Lens degrades due to IOn Accelerated If shutter failure 
bombardment from thruster (open) occurs 
--
-_.-
--- --
9-02 Operational C328 Module Overheat Module overheats due to solar 
radiatIOn 
9-03 Operational Shutter Shutter Fallure Shutter elther stays closed or 
stays open 
9-04 Transport C328 Camera Mlsahgnrnent Camera mlsahgns wlth shutter 
openmg 
S & Payload t d 
Sct/Pay MItigation DIagnostic Repair Backup TRL Seventy LIkelIhood Risk Date Updated 
Level 
9-01 ProtectlOn Vla Blurry lmage 4 3 MED 3/15/2010 Adnel 
aiumlllum shleld Fldone 
box shutter 
9-02 Heat lS dlspersed Improper 3 2 MED 3115/2010 Adnel 
through truss FunctIOnahty Fldone 
9-03 Extenslve shutter No vlslble 3 2 MED 3/15/2010 Adnel 
testmg careful lmage or Fldone 
handling Blurry lmage 
9-04 Careful Images of 3 2 MED 3/15/2010 Adnel 
transportatlOn, shleld box Fldone 
securely fastened 
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